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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of cultural evidence in criminal cases is a subject that has
traditionally been approached with delicacy by a select group of scholars.
The question of whether a male rape defendant ought to be able to mitigate
his offense by offering contextual evidence of the contrasting practices and
beliefs of his own culture engages both multiculturalist and feminist
scholars. In many ways, the social and ethical issues have been thoroughly
debated by these two groups.1
Yet, the descriptions offered by cultural evidence scholars of both the
problems and the solutions have been narrow, and the audience for the
debate has been relatively small. This Essay endeavors to step away from
the debate to view the issue from a broader, criminal justice perspective.
If the problems identified are not unique to cultural evidence cases, but

* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School; J.D., Stanford Law School. I want to
thank Kenneth Nunn and Cynthia Lee for inviting me to participate in this meaningful discussion.
I am also indebted to Felice Batlan for her comments and support. I also thank my extraordinary
research assistant, Amanda Walker.
1. See Daina C. Chiu, Comment, The CulturalDefense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation,
and Guilty Liberalism,82 CAL. L. REV. 1053 (1994) (summarizing and characterizing the views
generated by the debate).
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rather systemic problems inherent in the criminal justice system, then
there is a greater likelihood of a larger audience that will seek to change
the system.
Cultural evidence scholars identify three basic problems with the
presentation of cultural evidence in criminal cases.2 Scholars first discuss
the problem of negative stereotyping of the defendant's culture, to the
detriment of all members of that culture.' Second, many scholars argue
that the use of cultural evidence largely inures to the benefit of male
defendants who are accused of crimes that oppress women and children of
that culture.4 Finally, some scholars argue that the overall problem is that
the acceptance of cultural evidence in the courtroom is inconsistent or rare,
dependent on the cultural sensitivity ofjudges' If there is any consistency

2. The scholars are grouped for the purposes of description. Certainly, not all ofthe scholars
agree on the three problems described herein, and sometimes these descriptions of the problems are
inconsistent with one another. Nonetheless, these are the themes that emerge time and again, and
the variations on these themes are slight.
3. See, e.g., CYNTHIA LEE, MURDERANDTHEREASONABLEMAN: PASSIONANDFEARINTHE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 105 (2003); Rashmi Goel, Can I CallKimura Crazy? Ethical Tensions in
the CulturalDefense, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 443,443-44 (2004); Kay L. Levine, Negotiating
the BoundariesofCrime andCulture:A SociolegalPerspectiveon CulturalDefense Strategies,28
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 78-79 (2003); Damian W. Sikora, Note, Differing Cultures, Differing
Culpabilities?:A Sensible Alternative: Using Cultural Circumstancesas a MitigatingFactor in
Sentencing, 62 OHIO ST.L.J. 1695, 1708-09 (2001); Nancy S. Kim, The CulturalDefense and the
Problem of CulturalPreemption:A Frameworkfor Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101, 132 (1997);
Valerie L. Sacks, An IndefensibleDefense: On the Misuse of Culturein the CriminalLaw, 13 ARIZ.
J. INT'L& COMP. L. 523,544 (1996); Holly Maguigan, CulturalEvidence andMale Violence: Are
Feminist and MulticulturalistReformers on a Collision Course in CriminalCourts? 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 36 (1995); Chiu, supra note 1, at 1107; Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture:Asian Women
and the "CulturalDefense," 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 62 (1994).
4. See, e.g., LEE, supranote 3, at 103; Sikora, supra note 3, at 1709-1711; Kim, supra note
3, at 111; Doriane Lambelet Coleman, IndividualizingJustice Through Multiculturalism: The
Liberals'Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1137-42 (1996); Maguigan, supranote 3, at 36; Chiu,
supra note 1, at 1101, 1119-20; Alice J.Gallin, Note, The Cultural Defense: Underminingthe
PoliciesAgainst Domestic Violence, 35 B.C. L. REV. 723, 725 (1994); Volpp, supra note 3, at 9394; Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against Women in
Pacific-Asian Community and the CulturalDefense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1312 (1991).
5. See, e.g., ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 23 (2004); Maguigan,
supra note 3, at 54-55; Taryn F. Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the
American CriminalJustice System FormallyRecognize a "CulturalDefense "? 99 DICK. L. REV.
141, 155 (1994); Anh T. Lam, Culture as a Defense: PreventingJudicialBias Against Asians and
Pacific Islanders, 1 ASIAN AM. PAC. ISLANDS L.J. 49, 53 (1993); Alison Dundes Renteln, A
Justificationof the CulturalDefense as PartialExcuse, 2 S.CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 437,
452 (1993) [hereinafter Renteln, A Justification];Note, The CulturalDefensein the CriminalLaw,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1986) [hereinafter Note].
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at all, it is that cultural evidence is admitted when the cultural attribute is6
perceived as "sameness" with the dominant culture and not "difference.",
Central to the scholars' critique is that these problems are unique to
cultural evidence cases, largely due to the cultural and gender insensitivity
of the actors in the criminal justice system. Most of the articles addressing
this issue focus on the same small handful of criminal cases to demonstrate
one or more of the problems,7 and each of the scholars makes a proposal
for change narrowly tailored to the issue of acceptance of cultural evidence
in the courtroom. Driving the analysis of the use of culture in criminal
cases is, however, a much larger concern about the treatment of cultural
differences in society. 8
This Essay makes a distinction between societal problems and
courtroom problems, beginning with the premise that it is not, nor should
it be, the primary goal of the criminal justice system to solve societal
problems. This Essay makes no initial assumptions about what problems
may or may not exist with the use of cultural evidence in the courtroom. 9
Rather, it looks at the cases previously discussed by scholars, as well as a
larger group of cases,'0 and asks: Do the cases, individually and as a
whole, in fact illustrate the problems identified by the scholars? If not, why
not? And if so, are the problems unique to cultural defendants or endemic
to the criminal justice system? If the latter, are they issues with which the
criminal justice system should or can be concerned?
6. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 3, at 107-08; Chiu, supranote 1, at 1125 n.303; Levine, supra
note 3, at 80-81.
7. Most of the scholars focus primarily on four cases: People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988); People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Nov. 21,
1985); People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. App. 1991); Peoplev. Moua, No. 315972-0 (Fresno
Cy. Super. Ct., Feb. 7, 1985). See, e.g., LEE, supranote 3 (discussing Chen, Moua, Kimura); Goel,
supra note 3 (discussing Kimura); Levine, supra note 3 (discussing Chen, Wu); Kim, supra note
3 (discussing Chen, Kimura, Moua); Coleman, supra note 4 (discussing Kimura, Chen, Moua);
Gallin, supra note 4 (discussing Moua, Chen, Wu); Volpp, supra note 3 (discussing Chen, Wu);
Chiu, supra note I (discussing Kimura, Moua, Wu); Renteln, A Justification, supra note 5
(discussing Wu, Chen); Lam, supra note 5 (discussing Kimura).
8. See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 1,at 1055 ("without an historical understanding of the
sociopolitical context in which the cultural defense has arisen, the debate about the defense can
only replicate the traditional ways in which American society has marginalized Asian
Americans.").
9. It is not difficult to believe that judges and juries, who are primarily white and male, have
difficulty dealing with the cultural issues. However, the approach of this Essay is to leave that
belief aside for the moment and look at the treatment of cultural evidence in the cases themselves
to see whether, and how such biases are manifested.
10. Without trying to do an empirical study of all of the cases in which cultural evidence was
an issue, I relied on the approximately fifty cultural evidence cases, published and unpublished,
cited in the footnotes of the articles and books cited in notes 3, 4 and 5 supra.
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From this broader perspective, the three identified problems take on a
different form. Part II of this Essay discusses the negative stereotyping by
actors in the criminal justice system, and finds that, although it does occur,
it appears to be the result of a breakdown of the adversary process more
than cultural insensitivity." In addition, even if the cultural evidence can
be identified as "negative" or a "stereotype," it can and should be an issue
for the courts, as opposed to society at large, only if the evidence is
unreliable or untrue.
Part 111 demonstrates that the oppression problem is not unique to
cultural evidence cases, but is a larger criminal justice issue. For example,
"heat of passion," manslaughter, and the defense of mistake of fact in rape
cases have, by definition, traditionally allowed lenient treatment of male
defendants who abuse, kill, and rape women, regardless of the national
origin of the defendant or his cultural beliefs. The gender biases
manifested in these substantive crimes and defenses are most effectively
addressed as part of a larger legal agenda. Further, a study of the cultural
evidence cases shows that judges and juries do not routinely allow cultural
evidence to exculpate or mitigate guilt in cases of men violating women.
Hence, there is a danger in seeking a solution to a problem that may not
exist.
Finally, Part IV discusses the "inconsistency problem," a problem that
is described as inevitably leading to injustices. The scholars making this
claim choose cases for direct comparisons that are, in fact, very different.
Some scholars also claim that judges by and large simply reject cultural
evidence as a matter of course. Yet, case law reveals that courts are willing
to admit cultural evidence when relevant. Case law further demonstrates
that courts reject cultural evidence when the defense has utterly failed to
advocate the relevancy, not because the judges are insensitive to cultural
issues. Finally, the assumption that inconsistency itself is a problem is not
necessarily correct in a criminal justice system that seeks individualized
justice.
By taking the focus off of cultural sensitivity, this Essay shows that the
admission of cultural evidence may not present as many problems as
perceived; and to the extent the cases reveal problems, they are best
addressed as systemic problems within the criminal justice system.

11. The term "cultural insensitivity" is used throughout this Essay to describe the dominant
culture's hostility to, or ignorance of, the significance of cultural differences and their relevance
to the defendant's crime.
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II.

THE STEREOTYPING PROBLEM

The first concern of cultural evidence scholars is that the actors in the
criminal justice system are insensitive to negative stereotyping when
cultural evidence is proffered on behalf of a defendant. There are two
aspects to an analysis of this concern. First, a closer study of People v.
Chen,12 the case most often cited for this problem, reveals a larger criminal
justice advocacy problem. Second, the label of "negative stereotyping" is
a value judgment to which the criminal justice system is neither obligated
nor designed to respond.
Feminists and multiculturalists are unhappy with the proceedings and
the result in People v. Chen. According to critics, the expert in the case
engaged in the worst form of stereotyping of Chinese culture, the judge
allowed and embraced
the expert testimony, and a woman's life was
3
devalued as a result.'
In 1987, Dong Lu Chen, a Chinese-born man living in New York,
confronted his wife, Jian-Wan, about his suspicion of her infidelity. 4 After
she admitted the affair, he became so enraged that he hit her eight times in
the head with a claw hammer, killing her. 5 Chen was charged with
second-degree murder. 6 At the bench trial, Dr. Burton Pasternak, a
professor of anthropology, testified for the defense that a "normal
Chinese" would have reacted similarly to Chen, and that "[i]n general
terms, I think that one could expect a Chinese to react in a much more
volatile, violent way to those circumstances than someone from our own
society." 7 Pasternak explained that "casual sex, adultery, which is an even
more extreme violation, and divorce" are deviant behavior and adultery by
a woman is a "stain" upon a man, who has lost "the most minimal standard
of control."' 8 A Chinese cuckold would be considered a "pariah" among
Chinese women.' 9 While Pasternak had not heard of a woman in China
being killed in such circumstances, he testified that, under the

12. People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 2, 1988).
13. See, e.g., Volpp, supra note 3, at 74-75. See also LEE, supra note 3, at 103-05 (arguing
that Chen demonstrates that when cultural evidence is admitted race is privileged over gender and
culture is presented as one-dimensional, fixed and static, and negative stereotypes are perpetuated).
14. Volpp, supra note 3, at 65 nn.35-37 (quoting transcript of Record at 67, People v. Chen,
No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988) [hereinafter Record]); LEE, supranote 3, at 96; Chiu,
supra note 1, at 1053 n.1 (citing news article).
15. LEE, supra note 3, at 96.
16. Id.; Kim, supra note 3, at 120.
17. Volpp, supra note 3, at 65-66 n.41 (quoting Record at 74).
18. Id. at 68-69 n.53 (quoting Record at 55).
19. Id. n.57 (quoting Record at 55).
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circumstances of this case, the Chinese community would have intervened
before the wife was killed.2 .
Justice Edward Pincus, the trial judge, relied heavily upon Pasternak's
testimony of cultural difference, stating, "were this crime committed by
the defendant as someone who was born and raised in America ...the
Court would have been constrained to find the defendant guilty of
manslaughter in the first degree.",2 1 Instead, Justice Pincus found him
guilty of second-degree manslaughter and sentenced him to five years
probation.22 The judge described Chen as "a victim that fell through the
23
cracks because society didn't know where or how to respond in time.
The expert testimony and result in Chen are highly problematic from
both a multiculturalist and a feminist perspective. Leti Volpp convincingly
explains that Pasternak, a white male anthropologist who testified he was
"your average American, ' ' engaged in egregious and erroneous
essentialism of Chinese culture, depicting it as "static, monolithic and
misogynist. "25 "This fetishization of 'difference' enabled Pasternak's
creation of a 'cultural defense' for Dong Lu Chen by depicting gender
relations in China as vastly different from gender relations in the United
States.,26 Volpp adds that the evidence suffered from the lack of a female
perspective. 21 Jian-Wan Chen would have had a different view of Chinese
culture as one in which women object to violence and oppression.28
The critique of Chen holds the judge, the defense attorney, and the
expert liable for insensitivity to issues of culture and negative
stereotyping.29 However, that is neither the most accurate nor the most
helpful description of the problem in Chen, particularly if the point of
describing the problem is to devise a solution. Justice Pincus would likely
be confounded by accusations of cultural insensitivity. He fully credited
the evidence of cultural traits that the defense offered.3" Indeed, had Justice

20. Id.n.60 (quoting Record at 106-07); id.n.71 (quoting Record at 302).
21. Id. n.70 (quoting Record at 301-02).
22. Kim, supra note 3, at 120; Chiu, supra note 1, at 1053 n.3 (citing news article).
23. Volpp, supra note 3, n.75 (quoting Record at 355).
24. Id.at 70 (quoting Record at 76).
25. Id.at 62.
26. Id.at 72.
27. Id.
28. See Volpp, supra note 3, at 74-76 ("But where was Jian Wan Chen in this story? The
defense strategy rendered her invisible;" "a Chinese immigrant woman [] might describe divorce,
adultery and male violence within 'Chinese culture' very differently").
29. See, e.g., id.at 76 (critiquing all three in her description of the proceedings); Kim, supra
note 3, at 124 (critiquing the expert).
30. See Volpp, supranote 3, at 72-73 (quoting Record at 301-02).
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Pincus declared Chen's Chinese background irrelevant and treated him
like any other American, he would have been subject to the accusation that
he was a culturally-insensitive assimilationist.3 1
Unless the prosecution offers its own expert to counter the testimony
of a defense expert, a judge cannot be expected to recognize inaccurate
stereotyping by the defense expert." For better or for worse, factfinders
often take their cues from experts.33 It was not unreasonable for Justice
Pincus to assume that Pasternak knew more about Chinese culture than he
did.
A critic might also assign blame or responsibility for perpetuating
negative stereotypes upon the defense attorney who placed the expert on
the stand.34 However, it is both unrealistic and inappropriate to ask the
defense attorney to define his or her role in this manner. The ethical duty
to zealously represent a criminal defendant means a defense attorney must
seek out any and all helpful witnesses, including experts.35 Unless there is
an issue of knowingly fostering perjured testimony, the defense attorney's
decision to place that witness on the stand is only one of strategy, not
ethics. A zealous advocate cannot discount a helpful defense expert
because he or she may be disseminating negative information about the
defendant's culture.

31. See Chiu, supra note 1, at 1104-05 (arguing that those against a cultural defense are
supporting coercive assimilation); Volpp, supra note 3, at 61 (criticizing those who have touted
assimilation over cultural diversity in treatment of a cultural defense).
32. See Maguigan, supra note 3, at 78 ("One cannot know, of course, whether the outcome
in Chen would have been different had the judge been presented with evidence to rebut the defense
expert. Would he still have accepted uncritically the anthropological evidence on which he based
his verdict? Given that unanswerable question, it is important not to use this case as the basis for
a conclusion that the receipt of evidence of traditional patriarchal values will necessarily lead to
outcomes that appear to validate those values. The Chen case demonstrates simply that unrebutted
defense cultural evidence can operate to raise a reasonable doubt about the prosecution's proof of
the mens rea requisite for convicting the defendant of a more serious offense.").
33. The entire purpose of the expert is to "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue." Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See also Advisory Committee's
Note to 2000 Amendment to Rule 702 (referring to "the venerable practice of using expert
testimony to educate the factfinder on general principles.").
34. In her detailed description of the case, Volpp describes the defense strategy as distasteful
and as the product of the collusion of the defense attorney, Stewart Orden, and the expert. See
Volpp, supra note 3, at 67-68.
35. See, e.g., National Legal Aid and Defender Association Performance Guideline 4.1 (b)(7)
("Counsel should secure the assistance of experts where it is necessary or appropriate to:
preparation of the defense; adequate understanding of the prosecution's case; rebut the
prosecution's case."), available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderStandards/
PerformanceGuidelines [hereinafter NLADA Guidelines].
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Contrary to this position, Rashmi Goel has suggested that a defense
attorney should take into account the effect of negative stereotyping on the
defendant when assessing strategy.16 Goel ultimately concluded that using
37
cultural evidence is a strategy choice that should be left to the defendant.
While there may be no quibble with this modest suggestion, the
practicalities are that the defendant is going to favor the production of the
evidence. Any strategy choice normally left to the defendant, such as the
decision whether to testify or to plead guilty, should not be made without
the advice of his or her attorney.3" For Goel's suggestion to be triggered,
the defense attorney would first have to recognize that the expert was
offering a negative stereotype. If either the attorney or the defendant
recognized this, the attorney would then inform the defendant whether, in
his or her opinion, the chance of gaining the sympathy of the judge or jury
is likely greater if the defense expert testifies than if he does not.39
In People v. Kimura,40 for example, if the defense attorney had
followed Goel's advice, the outcome of the case would likely have been
the same. In Kimura, Fumiko Kimura walked her two children into the
ocean to drown them and herself after learning that her husband had been
unfaithful. 4 ' Bystanders pulled all three of them out of the ocean; but the
two children had drowned.42 Kimura was charged with first-degree
murder.43 According to Japanese culture, a parent commits oja-shinku,"
or parent-child suicide, when the parent is so shamed and devalued by the
spouse's infidelity that she sees little choice but to kill herself. The mother
also kills her children because they will suffer from shame and neglect if
left behind.45

36. Goel, supranote 3, at 458.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., NLADA Guideline 6.3(a) ("Counsel should inform the client of any tentative
negotiated agreement reached with the prosecution and explain to the client the full content of the
agreement, and the advantages and disadvantages and the potential consequences of the
agreement").
39. For example, in Chen, the defense attorney's decision to put Pasternak on the stand was
a winning strategy, and, since his client received a sentence to a mere five years probation, it is
unlikely Chen was unhappy with the testimony.
40. No. A-091133 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County, Nov. 21, 1985).
41. Goel, supra note 3, at 443.
42. LEE, supranote 3, at 121.
43. Id. at 121-22.
44. This is the spelling used by Renteln. Renteln, A Justification,supranote 5, at 463. Goel
spells the term oyaku shinju. Goel, supra note 3, at 443. Finally, Lee spells it oya-ko shinju. LEE,
supra note 3, at 121.
45. See Coleman, supranote 4, at 1109-10. This is likely an oversimplified description of the
tradition. A study of the practice in Japan showed that there was no one social or legal consensus
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Goel objected to the defense strategy of pleading temporary insanity,
because it painted Kimura as crazy, when she was not, "depriv[ing] her of
a dignified narrative" and effectively removing her from her place in the
community.4 Following Goel's advice to let Kimura decide whether to
adopt this strategy, a good defense attorney would still advise her that
there was no complete defense to the charge of first-degree murder if she
did not agree to a temporary insanity defense.47 Further, if she agreed to
plead to voluntary manslaughter, the prosecutor would agree to a term of
probation.4 8 While it is undoubtedly the rare defendant who would refuse
the sole defense to the charge because it painted her culture in a negative
light, the vast majority of defendants facing murder charges would likely
accept this as the cost for freedom.49
Finally, we reach the most likely question behind the perpetuation of
negative cultural stereotypes in the criminal justice system: Was the expert
in Chen responsible? Pasternak would likely defend his testimony as an
accurate portrayal of the culture he observed, whether negative or
stereotyped. 50 It may be that Pastemak is a liar, but it is more likely that he
is not a particularly perceptive or thorough anthropologist." Like any
profession, some of its members are better than others. The real issue in
Chen was not whether Pasternak engaged in rank stereotyping with no
empirical backing,52 but how it came to pass that he testified at all.
about the status of the practice. See Tamie L. Bryant, Oya-ko-Shinju: Death at the Center of the
Heart, 8 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 8-10 (1990).
46. Goel, supranote 3, at 455-56.
47. Insanity is a complete excuse, while manslaughter the most logical description of her
crime (but not discussed by Goel) - is a partial excuse, mitigating the crime of murder to a lesser
charge. Goel admits that if Kimura's lawyer had argued that she was acting rationally, it would
have likely resulted in a guilty verdict for first-degree murder. Id.at 451.
48. Goel suggests that there was another option for the defense: the attorney could have
simply argued "that what Kimura did was not wrong and that our own notions of suicide,
mothering, and interdependence should be reexamined." Id.at 456-57. However, it is unclear how
that argument negates the elements of murder and how the jury could have used it except to nullify
the charges.
49. I am relying upon my experiences in human motivation as a criminal defense attorney,
representing hundreds of clients over the course of eight years. I am not suggesting that this is a
desirable dilemma for a defendant. However, it is not at all unusual that in criminal cases the
defendant must swallow some pride to put on the best defense. All excuse defenses - insanity,
duress, intoxication - are built on the notion that what the defendant did was not desirable, but
understandable.
50. Pasternak's source for his opinions appeared to be his own observations through
fieldwork he conducted in China between the 1960s and 1988. Volpp, supra note 3, at 70.
51. Id.
52. Volpp's review of the record in the case showed that when the prosecutor pressed
Pasternak for his sources for his observations of Chinese culture, he "mentioned fieldwork he did
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According to prevailing evidence law, the trial judge is supposed to act
as the "gatekeeper" of scientific evidence, deciding as a threshold matter
whether the expertise is reliable. 3 It appears that Pasternak was qualified
to testify to aspects of Chinese culture (that was his area of study and
expertise). 4 The issue for critics was whether his methods and conclusions
were valid." The best practice is for a judge to hold a pretrial hearing to
determine whether the evidence the expert will offer is reliable. 6 At such
a hearing, the prosecution could have probed the bases and accuracy of
Pasternak's conclusions about Chinese culture as well as offered its own
expert. According to scholars like Leti Volpp, Pastemak's observations
were not based in reality,57 and so it should not have been that difficult for
the prosecution to counter his testimony. It does not appear that such a
pretrial hearing took place in Chen."
between the 1960s and 1988 (he could not remember the title of his own article), incidents he saw,
such as a man chasing a woman with a cleaver, and stories he heard. He admitted he could not
recall a single instance in which a man in China killed his wife or having ever heard about such an
event ..."Id.
53. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (interpreting
the requirements for Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
54. Justice Pincus described Pasternak as "perhaps, the greatest expert in America on China
and interfamilial relationships," Volpp, supra note 3, at 73 (quoting Record, supranote 14, at 30102).
55. I am accepting Volpp's judgment of the accuracy of Pasternak's conclusions here, by
assuming she is versed in Chinese culture, whereas I am not. Nonetheless, her condemnation of the
expertise in Chen and praise for the expertise in People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991), suggests that the gender of the criminal defendant matters in the evaluation. Reading the
opinion in Wu, the experts appear to make numerous conclusory assumptions about the motivations
of Wu in killing her son. See, e.g, id.at 874-75, 885-86 (quoting from testimony of Dr. Chien).
Volpp later reconciles her position against the cultural evidence in Chen and for it in Wu based on
an "antisubordination" principle: Wu resisted subordination and Chen acted to constrain his wife's
choices. Volpp, supra note 3, at 97. Volpp would allow essentialized, monolithic descriptions of
culture if it served the "antisubordination" principle. For example, in discussing the case of Chong
Sun France and how her defense would have benefited from cultural evidence, she states, "While
the community's presentation of cultural information runs the risk of essentializing Korean
immigrant women in the eyes of the court and of popular culture, the risk can be justified in that
it was the affected community of Korean immigrant-women who made that strategic choice ..
Id.at 96-97.
56. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
57. Volpp, supra note 3, at 70.
58. Volpp's search of the record in Chen shows some cross-examination ofPasternak at trial,
which did not appear to unseat the expert, but merely entrenched his essentialist views of Chinese
culture. See, e.g., Volpp, supranote 3, at 71 ("When [the prosecutor] pressed Pasternak about [his
description of the] 'average American,' Pasternak responded by positioning 'us'/'American' and
'them'/'Chinese' as 'two extremes."'). Without a counter expert of its own, the prosecution was
unable to shake Pasternak's foundations. According to Doriane Coleman, the prosecution believed
that thejudge would not credit the cultural evidence and therefore did not challenge the description

DECONSTRUCTING THE CULTURAL EVIDENCE DEBATE

Judges are generally unwilling gatekeepers, because their abilities in
judging science are limited.59 In addition, as in Chen, any judge is going
to be hard-pressed to expose the inaccuracies in an opinion by an expert
without hearing from counter-experts offered by the opponent. The bases
of Pasternak's opinions were apparently weak, and that would have been
a reason to consider excluding his testimony,6" but, it appears Justice
Pincus did not know that.
It is important to emphasize that the valid objection to Pastemak's
testimony at Chen's trial would have been its inaccuracy, and not solely
that the testimony negatively stereotyped culture. It is not always the case
that a negative stereotype is untrue, or insupportable. It may be labeled a
"negative stereotype" by some, but still considered a valid cultural trait by
anthropologists.6 If the information conveyed by the expert has some

or veracity of the custom. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 1109.
59. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded By Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in
Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 55, 72-73 (1998); Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness
Predicament:Determining "Reliable" Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho and the
ProposedAmended Rule 702 of the FederalRules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 317, 325
(2000).
60. See Advisory Committee's Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ("The trial judge in all
cases of proffered expert testimony must find that it is properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not
speculative before it can be admitted"; "[tihe more subjective and controversial the expert's
inquiry, the more likely the testimony should be excluded as unreliable.").
61. Additionally, an accusation of stereotyping is easily leveled in social science fields such
as anthropology and must be carefully scrutinized. In anthropology, the description of a "culture"
depends upon shared traits. The fact that all may not share the traits, or that there are subgroups,
is an important part of the study, but does not defeat the importance of identifying distinguishing
features of the "culture" in order to understand it. Nor does it make studies in the field of
anthropology inadmissible in criminal cases. In psychology, for example, "syndromes" have been
identified for the purposes of treating persons who share the behavioral characteristics. The
"battered woman syndrome" was developed as a treatment technique, and so the prototypical
battered woman is given certain characteristics, like "learned helplessness." See LENORE E.
WALKER, THE BAITERED WOMAN SYNDROME 116-25 (2d ed. 2000). The translation from treatment
technique into a rigid courtroom defense has been a problem. See, e.g., Volpp, supra note 3, at 15053 (describing risks of creating "model battered woman" for courtroom use and citing other sources
for same view). However, even those who criticize the essentializing of culture in the courtroom,
such as Volpp, seem to find a place for "strategic essentialism" to describe a culture, for example,
when necessary to protect against oppression. See supranote 55 and accompanying text. Similarly,
but with less self-awareness, Goel objects to negative stereotyping, such as Japanese
"submissiveness," while she engages in her own "stereotyping," describing that "the essential
difference in Japanese societal mores is the deeply embedded notion of interdependence. Unlike
the high degree of individualism prized and promoted in American culture, Japanese culture values
relations and interdependence, where the self is submerged in the network of roles a person has in
relation to others." Goel, supranote 3, at 448. In other words, it is difficult to even discuss a culture
with some generalizing.
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empirical basis, then, despite its negativity, the criminal defendant must be
allowed to place it in front of the jury.62
There are other forces at play that counsel against rejecting expert
testimony containing a negative stereotype without definitive proof of its
unreliability. The intent of the U.S. Supreme Court in its landmark
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was to
liberalize the rules of admission of scientific expertise,63 and to leave the
testing of that evidence to the machinations of the adversary process. In
the words of the Court, "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence." This is particularly true when it is a criminal defendant
proffering scientific evidence. The constitutional right of the defendant to
present his or her defense65 points toward admission of the evidence and
reliance on the crucible of adversarial testing.66 From both an evidentiary
and a constitutional perspective, trial courts should err on the side of
admitting questionable expertise offered by a criminal defendant.67
Hence, the real problem in Chen was a breakdown in the adversarial
process. If Pasternak's testimony was patently unreliable, the prosecution
should have exposed this to the jury through the tools at its disposal: crossexamination, experts, and jury instructions.68 The prosecution failed to do
so. The criminal justice system is equipped to handle "shaky" expert

62. See Advisory Committee's Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ("'the trial court's role
as gatekeeper is not intended as a replacement for the adversary system."') (citation omitted).
63. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
64. Id. at 596 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
65. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (discussing accused's constitutional
"right to present a defense").
66. Rock, 483 U.S. at 44. The case cited by the Court in Daubert for this point was a case
about the accused's right to present a defense. See supra text accompanying note 64.
67. See generally Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment's Lost Clause: Unearthing
Compulsory Process, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1275 (making this point). Of the cultural evidence
scholars, only Maguigan acknowledges this point. See Maguigan, supra note 3, at 43 ("[T]he goal
of committing the criminal justice system to the effective prosecution of family violence offenses
should be accomplished, not by limiting the rights of defendants to present cultural information to
juries and judges, but by imposing on prosecutors the obligation to educate those juries and judges
so that dispositions do not reflect acceptance of a stereotypical view of the cultural legitimacy of
male dominance."). Compare, e.g., Coleman, supra note 4, at 1097-98 (asserting criminal law's
role is to protect victims over rights of defendants and discriminatory evidence as part of
defendant's case-in-chief should not be allowed).
68. See Maguigan, supra note 3, at 92 ("[I]ndividual prosecutors are best positioned to
counteract inclinations by juries and judges to rely on cultural data to trivialize men's violent
acts.").
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evidence.69 What it cannot, and should not, handle is the mere existence of
negative stereotypes and the people who perpetuate them.
III. THE OPPRESSION PROBLEM

Closely related to the objection to negative stereotyping is the objection
by some cultural evidence scholars to the perpetuation, or condoning, of
violence against women through the use of cultural evidence.7" This
objection short-circuits some much larger systemic problems. It is not a
problem unique to cultural cases, but a substantive criminal law issue in
male-on-female violence cases requiring legislative action. In addition,
many cultural evidence cases do not follow the pattern decried by the
cultural evidence scholars: factfinders often reject cultural excuses by
defendants in male-on-female violence cases.7

69. For example, in People v. Tou Moua,No. 328106-0 (Fresno County Super. Ct. Nov. 28,
1985), the defendant killed his allegedly unfaithful wife and pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter.
He asked to receive probation, offering expert testimony that in Hmong culture "a wife's adultery
is punishable by death and the husband must be the executioner." Maguigan, supra note 3, at 67
(describing case). The prosecution presented conflicting evidence that Tou Moua's cultural
tradition in fact offered two alternatives to his course of action: doing nothing or returning his wife
to her family. Id. at 93. With the benefit of both sides, the judge sentenced him to eight years
imprisonment. Id. at 66.
70. A few scholars voice the concern that ifit is not women who are being victimized through
the use of cultural evidence, it is children. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 1143-44; Gallin, supra
note 4, at 724. Ironically, perhaps, People v. Kimura and People v. (Helen) Wu are the two cases
cited for this concern. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 4, at 1146. In each of these cases, a mother
kills her child. It vastly oversimplifies these two cases to conclude that the child's voice was lost
through the use of cultural evidence. Rather, feminist scholars claim that it is through an
understanding of the nature of the tradition being practiced in these cases that the women's voices
are gained, women who had been mistreated in some form by the men in their lives. See, e.g.,
Coleman, supranote 4, at 1097; Volpp, supra note 3, at 74-76. In the handful of other cultural cases
involving children as victims, either the cultural evidence did not save the defendant from a severe
penalty for his violent actions, see, e.g., Gutierrez v. State, 920 P.2d 987 (Nev. 1996) (defendant
sentenced to death in horrific child abuse case, despite claim of cultural motivation), Bui v. State,
551 So. 2d 1094 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (defendant sentenced to death in killing of children, where
evidence of revenge was stronger than evidence of cultural motivation), or the evidence prevented
an injustice by explaining a parent's touching of his child as devoid of erotic content, see, e.g, State
v. Jones, No. 4FA-$84-2933 (Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 1985), citedin Sikora, supranote 3, at 1701
n.28 (Inupiat Eskimo acquitted of child molestation where cultural evidence showed his swatting
at crotch and pulling down pants of grandson a tradition of teasing behavior); State v. Kargar, 679
A.2d 81,85-86 (Me. 1996) (Afghani refugee's convictions of sexual assault vacated due to cultural
evidence kissing of infant's penis commonly understood in Afghanistan as act of love, not done for
sexual gratification).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 97-102.
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The two cases relied upon most by scholars to demonstrate the
oppression problem are People v. Chen and People v. Moua.72 There is no
question that the results of Chen and Moua were terrible for the female
victims, and that cultural evidence was key to treating the defendants with
leniency. In Chen, because of the use of cultural evidence, Justice Pincus
reduced the charge from first-degree manslaughter to second-degree
manslaughter.73 Chen's crime was not one of mere recklessness,
characteristic of second-degree manslaughter; but was clearly a firstdegree manslaughter committed intentionally. Chen's crime was
committed in the "heat of passion," and the reduction in charges was a
deliberate choice by the judge to nullify the greater charge.74 The judge's
rationale for both the charge and a sentence of probation was explicitly
based on the cultural evidence.
In People v. Moua, it was indisputable that the victim was forced to
have intercourse against her will. Kong Moua kidnapped a Laotian woman
from a college campus whom he knew and planned to marry, forcibly took
her to his house and had sexual intercourse with her against her will. 7 The
prosecution dropped the rape charges against him because cultural
evidence of a Laotian tradition ofzjpoj niam, marriage-by-capture, would
76
have been admitted at trial and would have made his conviction unlikely.
Like Chen, Kong Moua received a lenient sentence; after pleading guilty
to the misdemeanor charge of false imprisonment, he was sentenced to
ninety days in jail.77
While cultural evidence led to results that practically excused the male
defendants' violence against the women, the cultural evidence was only
relevant because of statutory elements and defenses for the crimes of
voluntary manslaughter and rape. 78 Feminist scholars and activists have

72. No. 315972-0 (Fresno County Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1985), cited in Maguigan, supra note
3, at 63 n.90.
73. See supratext accompanying notes 21 & 22.
74. See Renteln, A Justification, supra note 5, at 481 (arguing that the result in Chen was
unjust because he essentially got a complete defense, not a partial excuse).
75. See Rimonte, supra note 4, at 1311 (citing news articles).
76. According to the tradition, the victim's resistance to the rape was part of the customary
marriage ritual, necessary to consummate the marriage and to demonstrate her virtue. Maguigan,
supra note 3, at 64. See also Coleman, supranote 4, at 1106-07 (describing a Minnesota case where
a Hmong man kidnapped and raped a young girl, but, after speaking with members of the Hmong
community about the marriage-by-capture custom, the prosecutor decided to reduce the charges and
the defendant was fined $1000 with no jail time).
77. Maguigan, supranote 3, at 64. Coleman writes that he was sentenced to 120 days in jail.
Coleman, supranote 4, at 1094.
78. See infra note 81-85, 91-95 and accompanying text.
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criticized that substantive criminal law and called for reform for at least
thirty years.7 9 Feminists have had some success injecting the female voice
into criminal law, through the introduction of battered women's syndrome,
rape trauma syndrome, and rape shield statutes. However, the substantive
criminal law has not changed much.8"
Voluntary "heat of passion" manslaughter reduces a murder charge to
charge when the homicide is intentional but there is
manslaughter
a
"adequate provocation." At common law, adultery by a man's wife
committed in his presence was automatically adequate provocation.8
Automatic categories for provocation no longer exist, and instead the jury
is told to look for provocation that would cause a "reasonable man" to lose
his "cool."82 However, to this day the mitigating charge often benefits men
who kill the women in their lives, when the women cheat, leave, or in
some other way emasculate the traditional man.8 3 Further, in some states
that follow the Model Penal Code, murder can be reduced to manslaughter
without provocation, but upon "extreme emotional or mental disturbance"
caused by a "reasonable explanation or excuse."" In such states, it is even
easier for a jury to deliver the verdict mitigating murder to manslaughter
for men who kill the offending women in their lives.85
There is nothing unlawful about the use of the voluntary manslaughter
charge to excuse men who kill women in the heat of passion, as long as the
79. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images ofBattered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 79-80 (1991); Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife
Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 75 (1992).
80. See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact,2
TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 41 (1993) ("two decades of feminist law reform efforts to hold men
[Tihe criminal law's
responsible for raping women have yielded disappointing results ....
continued failure to deter and punish rape [is] horrifying.").
81. Joshua Dressier, Provocation:PartialJustificationor PartialExcuse? 51 MOD. L. REV.
467, 474 (1988) (describing categories).
82. See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1341-42 (1997) (describing "reasonable man" requirement).
83. See Coker, supra note 79, at 75-76; see Myrna Raeder, The Admissibility of PriorActs
of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1477 (1996) (citing 1995
Department of Justice study showing that, of the 68% of husbands who killed their wives charged
with first-degree murder, only 37% were convicted of that charge, while 32% were convicted of
manslaughter; all told, including pleas, only 21% of husbands who killed their wives were
convicted of first-degree murder).
84. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1985).

85. See Nourse, supra note 82, at 1339-42 (studying cases from Model Penal Code
jurisdictions and coming to this conclusion). The Pace University Battered Women's Justice Center
documented the uneven application of the law, reporting that "[T]he average sentence for a woman
who kills her partner is 15 to 20 years," while for a man, "it is two to six." Volpp, supra note 3, at
74 n.76 (citing 1993 Time article).
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jury finds the prosecution has met its burden of proving the elements of the
offense. Voluntary manslaughter statutes allow jurists and jurors to impose
their majoritarian traditional views of relationships between men and
women. Chen is nothing more than a typical heat of passion manslaughter
case.8 6 If we want to change the outcome in these cases, there are two
options. The first is to instruct jurors that certain types of provocation such as a woman leaving a man or being unfaithful to him - are per se
unreasonable. The danger in doing so, of course, is that per se categories
risk unjust applications, as they did in the past.8 7 Lessons of real, messy
and complicated life suggest that we leave it to those who hear the facts of
the individual case, and not policy makers, to decide what is "reasonable."
The domestic violence issue here is real, but must be attacked at its roots.
Only upon the education of society will judges and jurors begin to limit
their sympathy for such defendants.
The second option for change is to abandon the long-held belief that a
homicide committed under a "heat of passion" decreases, rather than
increases, culpability. The criminal justice system should either eliminate
the offense from the criminal code, or increase the punishment to that of
murder. However, voluntary manslaughter is a nod to the weaknesses in
all men and women, and there are many other cases that feminists and
multiculturalists would concede deserve the partial excuse. For example,
it is an invaluable option for women who kill their abusers but cannot
perfect a self-defense claim. 8
In fact, Fumiko Kimura's case is a perfect example of the need for an
expanded application of voluntary manslaughter in cultural evidence cases.
Judges, juries, and litigants too often think the only "passion" meriting the
mitigation is a man's anger and rage. 9 However, passion leading to
violence may be the kind of grief, despair, and shame that led Fumiko
Kimura to kill her own children. While she intended to kill them, a jury

86. See Chiu, supra note 1, at 1114 (stating that Chen was that of the "classic AngloAmerican paradigm of the husband catching his wife in flagrante delicto and killing her, or her
lover, or both."). However, the judge reduced the charges even further to involuntary manslaughter
based on the expert testimony, finding that this case was out of the ordinary. As already discussed,
the problem in this case was that there was no counterweight to the expert testimony. Chen's
motivations were no different than those of men bom and raised in American culture.
87. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 2003) § 15.2, at 779-80 (stating
that juries composed mostly of men excused men from murder entirely when justification for
killing wife's lover was rage) (emphasis added).
88. See Renteln, A Justification,supranote 5, at 440, 503-04 (noting that, despite feminist
fears, sometimes women and children are beneficiaries of defense).
89. See Nourse,supranote 82, at 1344-45 (describing the traditional male view of "passion").
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should have the opportunity to mitigate her offense to voluntary
manslaughter.9"
Rape statutes, like voluntary manslaughter statutes, also have certain
elements that allow problematic outcomes like the one in People v. Moua.
Again, rather than a cultural evidence problem, it is a substantive criminal
law problem. While Kong Moua clearly raped his victim, the prosecutor
feared an acquittal because, in his jurisdiction and many jurisdictions, it is
a complete defense to rape when the defendant makes a reasonable
mistake of fact as to the victim's consent.9' Whether morally palatable or
not, the cultural evidence of the marriage-by-capture ritual would have
allowed experts to testify that Moua's belief that the victim was consenting
despite her protests was reasonable under the circumstances. Given that
Moua planned to marry his victim and the Hmong cultural tradition was
that, upon "kidnapping," the woman to be betrothed puts up a mock
struggle to show her virtue," Moua's mistake may well have been
reasonable. The issue here, as with the crime of manslaughter, is whether
there should be any such defense to rape. On one hand, such a defense
allows the operation of very conservative and traditional views of how
men and women act and may allow a jury to excuse otherwise inexcusable
behavior. Utilitarian theories ofjustice might advocate punishing the man
who makes such a mistake to encourage careful behavior. On the other
hand, crimes require proof of the mental state of the defendant, and, if he
honestly and reasonably believed she was consenting, retributive theories
of justice would counsel against punishing him.93 For example, the
reasonable mistake of fact defense operates in a date rape context to
protect men who reasonably believe, in the face of silence or lack of
protests, that the woman has consented.94 The mistake of fact defense
90. Her guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter reflects this compromise between murder and
acquittal. Even in Japan, she would not have been exonerated, but would have been convicted of
involuntary manslaughter and received a sentence of probation, much like the one she received in
this case. See Kim, supra note 3, at 117.
91.

See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 637-38 (4th ed. 2006) (stating

that the general rule is that a person is not guilty of rape if he genuinely and reasonably believed
that the female voluntarily consented to the intercourse with him). See also Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism, Method,and the State: Toward FeministJurisprudence,8 SIGNS 635, 654
(1983) (arguing that the "reasonable mistake defense" means that "a woman [was] raped but not
by a rapist."); Renteln, A Justificiation,supranote 5, at 485 (describing the often erroneously-held
belief that Moua was a mistake of law case as opposed to a mistake of fact case).
92. See supra note 76.
93. See DRESSIER, supra note 91, at 638 ("If a male genuinely and reasonablybelieves that
the female is consenting, then he is acting without moral culpability.") (emphasis in original).
94. Id. (arguing that "the expansion of rape law to include intercourse secured in the absence
of grave force or resistance, particularly in the acquaintance rape context" calls for consideration
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depends upon an understanding of the cultural beliefs of the defendant,
whether American or not. It may well be, as many feminists argue, that
there is no place in rape law for such a defense. That is a valid debate for
a state legislature. In the meantime, however, the only reason cultural
evidence would have been admitted in Moua was because of the
substantive law of rape.95
The larger claim cultural evidence scholars make is that Chen and
Moua are typical of how cultural evidence is used - namely, in a manner
that oppresses women.96 However, a review of fifty cultural evidence cases
paints a different picture. Out of the fifty cases, twenty-two of them
involved offers of cultural evidence in cases that did not involve violence
against women or children.97 Hence, cultural evidence cases do not
illustrate oppression as a whole. Of the eighteen that did involve an offer
of cultural evidence in defense of men harming women, 98 the court denied

of a mistake of fact defense).
95. By contrast, Coleman argues that in Moua and Chen, the substantive law was forsaken
in the face of cultural evidence, as the substantive law would have shown the defendants to have
the requisite mens rea. Coleman, supra note 4, at 1098, 1106-09. Clearly, this Essay finds the
opposite: the substantive law's mens rea requirements drove the admission of the evidence.
96. See, e.g., Gallin, supranote 4, at 724 (stating the cultural defense has been primarily used
in cases of domestic violence against women and children, citing Moua, Chen, and Wu); Coleman,
supra note 4, at 1095 ("the use of cultural defenses is anathema to another fundamental goal of the
progressive agenda, namely the expansion of legal protections for.., women and children.");
Goldstein, supra note 5, at 144 (arguing that a cultural defense would demonstrate that the United
States tacitly consents to violence toward women).
97. See People v. Odinga, 531 N.Y.S.2d 818 (App. Div. 1998); Mull v. United States, 402
F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1969); Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); United States v. Kills
Crow, 527 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992); TrujilloGarcia v. Rowland, 9 F.3d 1553, 1993 WL 460961 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished); People v. Estep,
583 P.2d 927 (Colo. 1978); United States v. Natal-Rivera, 879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989); Jenkins
v. State, 261 S.W.2d 784 (Ark. 1953); State v. Wanrow, 538 P.2d 849 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975);
People v. Metallides, Case No. 73-5270 (Fla. 1988) (unpublished); State v. Ganal, 917 P.2d 370
(Haw. 1996); case of Korean missionaries performing exorcism (cited in Levine, supra note 3, at
51); People v. Croy, 710 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1985); People v. Chou (unpublished, cited in Levine, supra
note 3, at 59); State v. Rodriguez, 204 A.2d 37 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1964); United States v. Carbonell,
737 F. Supp. 186 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); State v. Butler, No. 44496 (Lincoln County (Oregon) Cir. Ct.,
Mar. 11, 1981) (unpublished); Nguyen v. State, 520 S.E.2d 907 (Ga. 1999).
98. People v. Rhines, 182 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Haque, 726 A.2d 205
(Me. 1999); State v. Girmay, 652 A.2d 150 (N.H. 1994); People v. Poddar, 103 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1972); People v. Galicia, 659 N.E.2d 398 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (unpublished decision)
(described in Sikora, supra note 3, at 1717); People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 2,
1988) (unpublished); People v. (Kong) Moua, No. 315972-0 (Fresno County Super. Ct., Feb. 7,
1985) (unpublished); People v. Tou Moua, No. 328106-0 (Fresno Cy. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 1985)
(unpublished); State v. Her, 510 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); People v. Aphaylath, 68
N.Y.S.2d 945,502 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Gebreamlak, No. 80276 (Alameda Cy. Super
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admission of such evidence in five of those cases;" in six, the trier of fact
rejected the defendant's explanation, in whole or in part;0 0 and in two, the
defendant was convicted and received only a somewhat mitigated
sentence."° ' Of the five cases remaining, the use of cultural evidence to
explain or justify a male defendant's violence against a woman was
effective in drastically reducing the charge and sentence in only three
cases,02less than ten percent of the fifty cases, of which Chen and Moua are
two. 1

The male-on-female violence cases where the factfinder rejected the
implications of the cultural evidence used by the defense demonstrate that
there is not a knee-jerk dominant culture reaction to acquit or go easy on
the men. Looking at four of these cases, it appears that the factfinder used
common sense and legal judgment, and not cultural bias, to reject evidence
that was weak, marginally relevant, or unpersuasive.
For example, in contrast to the outcome in Moua, evidence of Hmong
cultural traditions was admitted in two other Hmong rape trials and the
jury convicted both men of rape. In State v. Her, °3 a Hmong defendant
charged with a forcible rape testified on cross-examination that rape as it
is understood in the United States does not exist in Hmong culture.'
Unlike Kong Moua, Her did not get the benefit of a bargain before trial.
Rather, he went to trial with the only cultural evidence being his weak
protestation on cross-examination, and there is no indication his attorney

Ct. 1985) (unpublished opinion), cited in Goldstein, supra note 5, at 156 n. 145; Commonwealth
v. Reid, cited in Levine, supra note 3, at 51; People v. Curbello-Rodriguez, 351 N.W.2d 758 (Wis.
1984); People v. Farrokhi, 414 N.E.2d 921 (I11.App. Ct. 1980); the case of Iraqi father arranging
marriage of underage daughters, cited in Sikora, supra note 3, at 1696-97); the case of Moosa
Hanouki, cited in Levine, supranote 3, at 57-58; State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. 1992); the
case of Kiet Vi Giang, cited in Maguigan, supra note 3, at 68 (describing unpublished case from
news sources).
99. Rhines, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 483-84; Haque, 726 A.2d at 207; Girmay, 652 A.2d at 151;
Poddar, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 88; Galicia,659 N.E.2d at 398.
100. Gebreamlak,cited in Goldstein, supra note 5, at 156 n. 145; Curbello-Rodriguez, 351
N.W.2d at 758; Farrokhi, 414 N.E.2d at 921; Her, 510 N.W.2d at 218; Kiet Vi Giang, cited in
Maguigan, supra note 3, at 68.
101. Tou Moua, No. 328106-0 (Fresno County Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 1985) (8 years);
Aphaylath, 502 N.E.2d at 998 (8 1/3 to 25 years).
102. The other is the case of the Iraqi father, who received a sentence to parenting classes. In
the other two cases remaining, Moosa Hanouki (cited in Levine, supra note 3, at 57-58) and
Commonwealth v. Reid (cited in Levine, supra note 3, at 51, 57-58), the murder charges were
reduced to manslaughter charges, but the sentence is unknown.
103. 510 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
104. Id. at 220 ("In my culture there is no such thing as rape.").
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marshaled
this evidence in pursuit of a mistake of fact defense as in
05
Moua. 1

In State v. Lee, the Hmong defendant was convicted after a jury trial of
the forcible rape of two Hmong women. °6 The court allowed defense
testimony by the leader of the Hmong cult as to what Hmong men and
women do when there is an accusation of rape, in an attempt to show that
the women accusing Lee did not behave as if they had been raped.' °7 The
prosecution presented conflicting rebuttal evidence.' Having the benefit
of both sides of this credibility debate, the jury rejected the implications
of the defendant's expert witness and found Lee guilty.10 9
In People v. Farrokhi,"° Medhi Farrokhi, an Iranian national, was
charged with having sexual relations with a female so mentally deranged
or deficient that she could not give effective consent to intercourse."' The
state was required to prove the defendant's knowledge of the victim's
deficiency."' The victim in this case was a mentally retarded nineteenyear-old girl with an I.Q. of 35, and a mental age between four and six
years old." 3 Farrokhi's defense was that, due to his difficulty speaking
English and his lack of familiarity with American social customs, he did
not perceive her mental condition." 4 The trial judge rejected this
explanation in light of the evidence that Farrokhi had lived in the United
States for two years, socialized and interacted with American students, had
studied English for six years while living in Iran, studied from textbooks
written in English at Texas Southwest College, and conversed with his
coworkers in English." 5 Therefore, the judge's decision to find the
defendant guilty as charged was not one of cultural insensitivity or bias,
but a rational and defensible credibility decision.
Similarly, in State v. Curbello-Rodriguez,"6 the cultural evidence
proffered by the defendant was allowed, but was weak and logically
rejected. 17 Lazaro Curbello-Rodriguez and his codefendants raped a

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See id. at 218.
State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. 1993).
Id. at 480.
Id.
Id. at 482.
414 N.E.2d 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
Id. at 922.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 926.
Id. at 925.
Farrokhi,414 N.E.2d at 923-25.
351 N.W.2d 758 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 770 (Bablitch, J. Concurring).
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sixteen-year-old girl multiple times at knifepoint. "8 The jury found him
guilty, and the judge sentenced him to eighty years in jail." 9 According to
the concurring appellate opinion, the defendant, a recent immigrant from
Cuba, testified that he thought the "women" were "available" when the
victim and her friend appeared at the apartment voluntarily asking for a0
dollar and smoking ajoint with men whose language they did not share.12
However, the defendant forced the victim to take off her clothes by
brandishing a knife and intimated that if the victims told anyone what had
occurred, he would hurt them or their families.' 2 ' Obviously, these facts
made it difficult for any jury to believe Curbella-Rodriguez reasonably
thought the victim was consenting.
In the five male-on-female violence cases in which cultural evidence
was not admitted at trial, cultural evidence scholars question whether this
complete exclusion was due to cultural insensitivity. 122 However, a close
look at the courts' reasoning in four of those cases reveals very basic
relevancy problems. 23 Whether or not the presiding judge may have had
a hidden agenda with a gender bias or a cultural bias, the evidence as
proffered was simply irrelevant.

118. Id. at 762.
119. In the remaining two of the six cases, it is less clear why the factfinder rejected the import
of the cultural evidence. However, the most logical explanation is that a court was simply not
accepting of the "witchcraft" excuse. If this is the case, then these two cases do reflect a degree of
cultural insensitivity. Kiet Vi Giang, an ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, pleaded guilty to seconddegree murder in the stabbing death of his wife. Maguigan, supra note 3, at 68 (describing case).
At sentencing, he presented cultural information as to the origins and context of his belief that she
was possessed by an evil spirit. Id. The judge sentenced him to fifteen years in prison, the
maximum sentence for voluntary manslaughter and half the maximum for second-degree murder.
Id. Hagos Gebreamlak attempted to kill a woman through witchcraft, cultural testimony was
allowed, and the jury convicted him of a lesser charge. The trial judge disagreed with the "voodoo"
defense and imposed the maximum sentence. See id. at 76 n. 150.
120. Id. at 770 (Bablitch, J., concurring). It is unclear whether cultural evidence was directly
offered to make this point, but Judge Bablitch's concurring opinion on appeal, where he opines that
the 80-year sentence was excessive, states "Perhaps, in his culture, such conduct at such an hour
would be widely interpreted as an invitation to sexual games by willing players familiar with the
possible consequences." Id.
121. Id. at 762.
122. It is this grouping of cases that splits the feminist scholars and the multiculturalist
scholars. See generally Maguigan, supra note 3. The former is satisfied by the exclusion of the
evidence and the latter is concerned about what the exclusion means for cultural minorities.
123. The fifth case is People v. Galicia,659 N.E.2d 398 (I11.App. Ct. 1994) (described in
Sikora, supra note 3, at 1717), an unpublished decision where it is less clear why the judge rejected
the evidence of witchcraft.
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In three of the cases cited by scholars as completely excluding cultural
evidence,' 24 that description is not accurate. Rather, the trial court in each
case made a ruling determining under what circumstances the evidence
would be relevant and admissible. In People v. Poddar,'25 State v.
Haque,'26 and State v. Girmay,'27 the defendant had moved to the United
States (Poddar and Haque from India, and Girmay from Ethiopia) to attend
school and each killed a woman who had rejected him. In each case, the
defense proffered an expert to demonstrate the effect of cultural stresses
on the defendant, and in each case, the court ruled the evidence
inadmissible as proffered, but admissible in a different form.
In Poddar,the main defense to the murder charges was that Prosenjit
Poddar was mentally ill when he killed his victim.128 There was ample
evidence of his mental instability. 2 9 The defense also made a much less
significant argument that Poddar was suffering from cultural stresses. 3 °
The trial judge ruled that the cultural anthropologist was not qualified to
testify as to how the cultural stresses affected Poddar. 13 1 However, the
judge also ruled that the witness could testify about the cultural stresses
generally, and' that the defense's psychiatric experts could answer32
hypothetical questions based on facts testified to by the anthropologist.1
This offer put the defense in essentially the same position. The defense
attorney inexplicably refused this limitation by the court and did not have
the anthropologist testify at all. 133 Despite the defense attorney's strategy,
it is unlikely that the exclusion of the expert had much determination on

124. See Renteln, A Justification,supranote 5, at 470 (citing Poddaras a case where the judge
excluded the cultural evidence); LEE, supra note 3, at 100 n. 19 (citing Girmay and Haqueas cases
excluding cultural evidence).
125. 103 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
126. 726 A.2d 205 (Me. 1999).
127. 652 A.2d 150 (N.H. 1994).
128. Poddar,103 Cal. Rptr. at 86, 103.
129. Id. at 86, 87.
130. Id. at 88.
131. Id.
132. Id. It is not unusual for courts to draw this line when allowing expert testimony. For
example, an expert in the unreliability of eyewitness testimony explains the vagaries of eyewitness
testimony to the jury but does not testify as to what effect the variables had on the particular
eyewitness in the case. See Hoeffel, supra note 67, at 1333. For the most part, this partial rejection
of the expert testimony is inconsequential because the jury still hears the expert's explanation of
the various factors and can apply them itself to the witness or defendant in the case.
133. Poddar, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (citing an incomprehensible explanation by defendant's
counsel).
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the outcome in Poddar,because the critical evidence offered to mitigate
the defendant's acts was his demonstrable mental illness.
Nadim Haque's defense theory, like Poddar's, was both mental illness
and extreme stress from cultural differences. 135 While the trial court denied
all testimony by a cultural anthropologist as to the differences between the
defendant's and the complainant's cultures, it did allow the medical expert
to testify as to the role that Haque's cultural background would have
played. 13 6 As in Poddar,the court understood the relevancy of the cultural
background to the defendant's mental state, and so the court allowed for
its admission in a certain format. However, a troubling feature of the
exclusion of the cultural anthropologist's testimony was the conclusion by
the appellate court that, as a matter of law, his testimony would not have
established adequate provocation to mitigate murder to manslaughter.'
According to the appellate court, the provocation in this case was the
victim's refusal to marry Haque, her desire to end the relationship and her
statement, "we [are] just too different."' 38 The appellate court boils this
provocation down to "mere words," which are not legally adequate
provocation in Maine.' 39 This description by the court is a stretch; the
provocation was not simply the words but the entire state of affairs, which
a reasonable juror may have found sufficient for adequate provocation.
The court makes short order of the cultural expert in this manner and it
would in fact seem to be most easily explained by cultural insensitivity.
In Girmay,'4 the proffered expert testimony on culture was less
relevant than in Poddarand Haque. The defendant pleaded insanity, and
the experts proffered by the defense included two psychiatrists and a
professor of history who was the director of an African studies program.141
The history professor would have testified to "general cultural, political,
and historical background of Ethiopia during the defendant's life; the
social and political dynamics of the Ethiopian civil war; and social
customs regarding marriage, gender relationships, and attitudes toward

134. Poddar was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to five years to life. The
conviction was overturned on appeal because of an unrelated instructional error. People v. Poddar,
518 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1974) (en banc). Instead of a new trial, however, the judge agreed to release him
as long as he returned to India, which he did. Renteln, A Justification,supra note 5, at 470 (citing
DEBORAH BLuM, BAD KARMA: A TRUE STORY OF OBSESSION AND MURDER (1986)).
135. State v. Haque, 726 A.2d 205 (Me. 1999).
136. Id. at207n.1.
137. Id. at 209.
138. Id.
139. Id
140. 652 A.2d 150 (N.H. 1994).
141. Id. at 151.
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insanity in Ethiopia."' 42 The trial court did not simply rule the evidence
irrelevant, however, but decided (similar to the judges in Poddar and
Haque) that it could be admitted to the extent that either of the medical
'
experts relied upon it for their conclusions about the defendant's sanity. 43
ruled
the
court
the
trial
features,
such
After neither psychiatrist relied on
testimony irrelevant.'" The defense attorney did not help the trial court to
make any other link between the evidence and the insanity defense and
submitted only that it was necessary to understand the defendant's
' Further, the defendant's background was admitted through
background. 45
the medical experts. 4 6 An Ethiopian psychiatrist testified concerning
Ethiopian marriage customs, the Ethiopian political situation since 1977,
Ethiopians' attitudes toward mental illness, and how mental illness is
manifested in Ethiopia.'47 It is difficult to see how this can be characterized
as a case of cultural insensitivity.
In People v. Rhines,'48 another of the five male-on-female violence
cases in which the judge denied admission of the cultural evidence,' 49 the
142. Id. This testimony would have amounted to a freestanding cultural defense, as it did not
negate any elements of first-degree murder, but merely gave contextual evidence that a jury might
find somehow excused his actions. Had the defense chosen a strategy of the lesser offense of heat
of passion manslaughter, then cultural evidence might have helped to explain provocation.
However, manslaughter is only a partial excuse, while insanity is a complete defense.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Girmay, 652 A.2d at 151.
The defendant argues that the excluded testimony was relevant to educate the jury
as to the social, cultural, and political world in which he had lived virtually all his
life. The defendant failed to show, however, the relevance of that world to the
issue of his state of mind at the time of the murders. In his offer of proof, defense
counsel stated that [the expert] 'would not render any opinion regarding the
mental state of [the defendant] at any point."' The defendant conceded that none
of [the expert's] testimony would relate to him specifically because [the expert]
did not know him. Counsel further conceded that his defense was not based upon
his culture: "[W]e are not raising a cultural defense here, because I am submitting
to the court that it's no more likely that someone in Ethiopia is going to commit
the acts that [the defendant] allegedly committed than it is here."
Id. at 152.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. People v. Rhines, 182 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
149. Rhines is a case concerning African American "culture." Although scholars raise the
question of whether subcultures within the United States ought to be included in the discussion
about cultural defenses, this Essay makes no such distinction and merely discusses the cases
covered in the existing scholarly work.
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defense attorney utterly failed to make the relevancy link. Jacinto Rhines
was convicted of raping a woman he had just met. 5 ' On appeal, he argued
that the trial judge erred in rejecting as irrelevant his proffer of an expert
witness to testify that black people speak to each other very loudly. 5 ' The
expert testimony was supposed to show that he had no reason to believe
that raising his voice would have coerced the complainant to consent to
sex.' 52 This point was irrelevant because the complainant never contended
that she submitted because of his loud voice. Instead the victim claimed
she submitted because of his use of force - he grabbed her wrist, pushed
her into the bedroom, took her pants off by force, pushed her onto the bed
and raped her.' 53
Hence, a more detailed accounting of some of the cases involving
cultural evidence belies a pattern of either cultural insensitivity or a gender
bias. Since the judiciary is made up primarily of white men from middle
to upper-class backgrounds,' 54 it is not difficult to imagine that such biases
exist. However, it is not helpful to assume that such biases are driving the
decisions and outcomes in criminal cases and to suggest solutions to a
problem that may not be manifesting itself in the way described by some
scholars. In most cases, the cultural evidence was entirely unpersuasive,
irrelevant, or not properly pursued by the defense attorney in order to
make the relevancy and the admissibility clear to the court.
IV. THE CONSISTENCY PROBLEM

The final problem pointed out by scholars is inconsistency in the
courts' handling of cultural evidence from case to case. In essence, the
argument is that similar cases are treated differently.' 55 There are two
points to the inconsistency argument: first, that minority culture
defendants are being treated inconsistently with the dominant culture

150. Rhines, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 479-80.
151. Id. at 483.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Sherrily A. Ifill, RacialDiversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public
Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 405, 407 n.3 (2000).
155. See, e.g., Note, supranote 5, at 1297 (arguing that the "absence of procedural safeguards
and guidelines leads to inconsistency in the treatment of cultural factors from case to case");
Renteln, A Justification,supranote 5, at 439 ("in the absence of any official policy guidelines, the
cultural evidence is treated differently from one case to the next, and from one court to the next.
This can lead to gross injustices, in which one defendant who commits murder goes free, while
another defendant who commits a less serious offense receives too harsh a punishment").
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defendants; second, that the cultural evidence cases are treated
inconsistently with one another. This section analyzes each of those claims
and finds them wanting. It then asks whether, in any event, consistency is
an appropriate focus of the criminal justice system.
The first overall claim of inconsistency is that judges are treating
cultural cases inconsistently with their dominant culture counterparts.
There is very little evidence supporting this point, but it is simply stated
that judges, due to their cultural insensitivity, find cultural evidence
irrelevant. 156 The cases just discussed in the previous section show that is
not necessarily the case.' 57 A study of the remainder of the cultural
evidence cases not covered in the previous section - the twenty-two cases
not involving oppression of women or children 5 ' - also point in the other
direction. In twelve of those cases, the court did not allow admission of the
evidence, but here again, close scrutiny of the courts' rationale shows
serious problems in most cases with the relevancy of the evidence, or with
the advocacy by the defense attorney to make the connection. 5 9 In the
156. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 3, at 100 ("it appears that most attempts to use culture to
exonerate or mitigate are not successful," either because "judges and jurors have difficulty placing
themselves in the shoes of the other" or "[j]udges may also exclude cultural evidence because they
believe it is irrelevant."); Renteln, A Justification,supra note 5, at 503 ("Instead of ruling that the
cultural evidence is admissible and then rejecting the argument based on it, courts pretend that the
evidence is simply not relevant"); Lam, supra note 5, at 61 (arguing that judicial bias will prevent
cultural evidence from being heard); Note, supra note 5, at 1297-98 (positing that absence of
procedural guidelines gives opportunity for officials to exercise prejudice against cultural
minorities); Maguigan, supra note 3, at 61 ("Judicial treatment of cultural information generally
falls into one of two extremes. Courts either fail to find any accommodation at all between cultural
information and existing mechanisms or receive cultural information in an unquestioning fashion
that sends a message that violence by men against women is tolerable.").
157. See also Maguigan, supranote 3, at 86 (stating that judges have the capacity to recognize
the relevance of cultural evidence and to craft jury instructions on the relevance and prosecutors
have the ability of effective cross-examination and identifying lay and expert witnesses in rebuttal,
but "motivation to exercise those capabilities is distributed unevenly").
158. See supratext accompanying note 97.
159. Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). The victim and Ha were both
Vietnamese. The victim, known by Ha to be a violent man, beat Ha severely the day before and
threatened to kill him. Worried that he would be killed if he did not kill first, Ha found him the next
day while the victim was grocery shopping and shot him in the back thirteen times. The trial court
denied a self-defense instruction to Ha. Ha argued that he should have received the instruction
because he felt he had no alternative since the police would not help him, both because they would
not understand him, and because Vietnamese culture teaches that police are corrupt and one must
take the law into their own hands. However, the appellate court found this argument unpersuasive
because there was simply no evidence that Ha was in imminent danger, even if he did have good
reason to fear future harm from the victim. The trial judge agreed with the defense attorney that
Ha's cultural background was relevant to assess his reasonableness, both in a self-defense claim
and in arguing for a lesser charge of "voluntary manslaughter." Id.at 197. Nguyen v. State, 520
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S.E.2d 907 (Ga. 1999). Thu Ha Nguyen shot her husband and stepdaughter and was convicted of
two counts of aggravated assault. Id. at 908. To support her defense, her attorney proffered an
expert who would testify the loss of status, humiliation, and possible adverse spiritual consequences
to defendant and her family from the pending divorce. Id. at 909. However, her defense was one
of self-defense, requiring her to allege a fear of physical attack, and there was nothing in the
cultural evidence that linked this loss of status and disrespect to fear of physical abuse. Id. at 90809.
United States v. Kills Crow, 527 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1975). Whitney Paul Kills Crow called
Rudolph Vargas out of his home and shot him in the leg. Both were Native Americans. In support
of his actions, Kills Crow wanted to call an expert to explain the concept of"Toka," which "results
in Indians of one reservation treating Indians from a different reservation as outcasts and enemies
simply because of the fact that they are 'foreigners."' Id. at 159 (citing defendant's own
explanation). The theory was that Kills Crow's family members were outcasts and Vargas' family
was harassing them, but there was no evidence of this. The trial judge struggled mightily with this
evidence, but could not see his way clear to allowing it in unless he first heard some evidence that
there actually was some bad blood between the families. Id.at 159-60.
United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, the Third Circuit upheld the district
court's decision not to take defendant's cultural background into account in sentencing. Jong Yul
Yu pled guilty to bribing a federal tax agent, and offered to the sentencing court that, based on his
Korean experience, he considered the bribe as an honorarium and that it could be viewed as an
insult not to offer the payment. The trial court rejected the evidence due to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines' provision that "national origin" is not relevant. The appellate court ruled, even if the
cultural evidence was not evidence of "national origin," it could not mitigate his sentence. Yu had
been in this country 12 years and was a naturalized citizen, and he was also a professional tax
preparer. Yu knew the law and knew his error as he himself admitted the bribe was a single act "of
aberrant behavior." Id.at 955.
Trujillo-Garcia v. Rowland, 1993 WL 460961 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished opinion). Eduardo
Trujillo-Garcia argued that the trial court erred in applying a reasonable person standard rather than
a reasonable Mexican male standard when it rejected his provocation defense. The appellate court
assumed without deciding that refusing to consider his cultural background was error, but found
the error harmless since the state appellate court had found that the "evidence established that the
petitioner was immature, quiet, moody, and vulnerable - more sensitive than the average Mexican
male." Id.at 2. Therefore, although the comments made to him would have been emotionally
provocative to a member of the Mexican culture, it would not have led the reasonable person to act
violently. Id.
People v. Estep, 583 P.2d 927 (Colo. 1978). The trial court in this case excluded defense expert
testimony concerning the cultural significance of facial hair to Koreans and the Supreme Court of
Colorado upheld this decision. The defendant's argument was that the Korean eyewitness did not
mention facial hair, which the defendant had, and she would have if she had seen it. Id.at 345-46.
The trial court's decision was purely one of evidence law - the proper foundation had not been
laid for the expert because the eyewitness had never been asked about her views on the cultural
significance of facial hair first.
United States v. Natal-Rivera, 879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989). The Eighth Circuit decided that it
was not a violation of due process that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not allow a sentencing
court to consider the defendant's cultural background when imposing sentence - here that the
defendant was socialized since childhood to follow her husband's every command, even if it
involves criminal activity. This is cultural insensitivity on the part of the sentencing court, since
the Guideline's limitations are easy to avoid.
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160
other ten cases, the judge allowed the cultural evidence.
Critics argue further that, even where the judges find the evidence
relevant, this relevancy is only found when the cultural evidence mimics
the values of the dominant culture. 6 Hence, it is posited, Chen is given
lenient treatment because his case represents a standard "heat of passion"
case.' 62 This is true to a certain extent, but recall that Justice Pincus

United States v. Carbonnell, 737 F. Supp. 186 (E.D.N.Y.) (in order to take into account factors
of defendant's Columbian heritage for a downward departure, the factors were categorized as "the
personal characteristics" of the offender).
Jenkins v. State, 261 S.W. 2d 784 (Ark. 1953). It is difficult to know what happened at the trial
level in this murder case, but on appeal, appellant's lawyer urged, "consider the fact that appellant
is a 'Mississippi Choctaw' Indian with an enigmatic personality and a cultural background into
which he and his ancestors have been forced over the years." Id. at 517. The Jenkins Court stated
that this information had been presented in a "convincing manner" but was better presented to the
executive of the State. Without more information, we do not know the link that might have been
made at trial or on appeal to his culture and his crime. There does not appear to be any discernible
link. The facts of the murder do not appear on their face to be culture-sensitive: appellant was
drinking, argued with some people over some trivia and then shot them. Id. at 512-14.
Mull v. United States, 402 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1968). Charles Mull, a Native American, was
convicted of assaulting another Native American. Charles Mull testified that he had "quite a lot of
beer" during the event. Mull's attorney proffered two experts in his defense, and the judge denied
both. The first was a cultural anthropologist who was going to testify to the low tolerance level of
Indians to alcohol and, on the basis of a hypothetical question, that the defendant was incapable of
forming the intent necessary for the crime. The trial judge objected to the anthropologist forming
an opinion about the defendant's intent, since it was neither in his expertise, nor did he have the
basis for such a conclusion. Id. at 574. The defense attorney did not pursue, as he should have,
allowing the expert to simply testify more generally about Indians and alcohol, allowing the jury
to reach its own conclusions about the defendant's ability to form the requisite intent. A second
expert was another cultural anthropologist who would have testified based upon the expected
testimony of Mull and his brother that the victim of the assault was exercising evil powers over
Mull. The expert would have then testified "that there is a state of mind subjectively within the
mind, or capable of being within the mind of an Apache Indian... which would cause him to feel
a justification for doing what ought to or had to be done in a given circumstance to rid himself of
the evil influence of this particular power over him." Id. at 575. The judge reiterated similar
reasoning in rejecting this testimony: "'The defendant may testify as to what was on his mind and
what he was thinking of, but the experts cannot say he was incapable of entertaining the specific
intent to do some bodily injury."' Id. Once again, the defense attorney failed to advocate that the
expert would only speak to witchcraft beliefs generally in order to educate the jury, and then the
jury could draw its own conclusions. As it was, the appellate court explained that neither Mull nor
his brother said a word about belief in evil powers on the witness stand.
160. See supra text accompanying note 97.
161. See Chiu, supra note 1, at 1113-14 (arguing that cases allowing cultural evidence to
negate defendant's state of mind, mitigate sentence, or reduce charges only recognize "cultural
sameness"); LEE, supranote 3, at 112 (arguing that cultural evidence is allowed only in cases with
"interest convergence" with dominant culture).
162. See LEE, supranote 3, at 114 (arguing that the claims of Asian immigrant men like Chen
who kill Asian immigrant wives for infidelity are the same as claims made by American men who
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reduced Chen's crime even further than he would have for the "average
American" because of the cultural evidence.' 63 Scholars also cite Moua for
this proposition. They argue that Kong Moua is treated with leniency
because his misunderstanding of the consent of his victim is reflective of
the dominant culture's rejection of date rape claims, where the defendant
also often misunderstands the consent of the complainant."6 While the two
kinds of claims share a mistake of fact defense, the facts of Moua are
unique and foreign to a typical jury. Kong Moua's perpetration of a
forceful rape through a marriage-by-capture ritual has no dominant culture
comparison.
Also, Daina Chiu argues that the lenient treatment of Fumiko Kimura
reflects sameness with dominant culture:
The favorable legal treatment of Fumiko Kimura derives from the
Anglo-American cultural view that women who kill their children
are 'victims in need of sympathy, support and psychiatric
treatment.' Women are 'assumed to be inherently passive, gentle,
and tolerant; and mothers are assumed to be nurturing, caring and
altruistic. It is an easy step, therefore, to assume that a 'normal'
woman could surely not have acted in such a way. She must have
'
been 'mad' to kill her own child. 65
kill wives); Chiu, supra note 1, at 1113-14 (stating that Chen only recognizes cultural sameness:
in both American and Chinese cultures, "a wife's adultery is a stain on the husband's honor as a
man.... The subordination of women and the privileging of the male sex-right are common to both
cultures.").
163. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
164. See LEE, supra note 3, at 120 (arguing interest convergence between Moua and date rape
cases). See also Chiu, supra note 1, at 1115:
The organizing principles of sex and rape are similar in both cultures, although the
Hmong version is much more straightforward and explicit.... [T]he judge based
his determination on a consideration of 'normal' male sexual behavior, not on
whether the Hmong woman believed she had been violated. The prosecutor and
the judge both believed that the woman did not genuinely consent, but they also
believed that the defendant genuinely thought that the woman was consenting to
the marriage ritual.
165. Chiu, supra note 1, at 1117. See also LEE, supra note 3 (stating that Kimura was treated
the same as most women who kill their young children). To make her point, Chiu contrasts Bui, a
case where a father killed his children and tried to kill himself and received a death sentence:
"Unlike women, men in Anglo-American culture who kill their children are perceived as 'wicked'
and in need of punishment." Chiu, supra note 1, at 1118. In Chen, Kimura, Moua, and Bui, then,
"difference collapses into sameness, as influenced by the dominant culture's perception of
appropriate gender roles." Id. at 1119.
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This is a strange observation, considering that American culture has no
accepted tradition of mother-child suicide, and, in fact, American culture
often treats mothers who harm their children very harshly.'66 Pregnant
women who abuse drugs are jailed, not treated.'6 7 Notorious cases of
deeply troubled mothers killing their children have led to harsh results. For
example, Susan Smith and Andrea Yates both drowned their children, and
16
both were convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison.
Therefore, an equally likely interpretation of the result in Kimura is that
the leniency was due to acquiescence to cultural difference.
The second inconsistency argument is that the judges' treatment of
cultural evidence is inconsistent from case to case, due to the lack of
guidelines, sensitivity, or a formalized defense. Several comparisons are
used to make this point. A first grouping is the parent-child suicide cases:
People v. Kimura1 9 is compared with People v. Wu, 7 ' and both are
compared with People v. Bui. "1 Second, two cases of women killing men,
State v. Wanrow 72 and the case of Kathryn Charliaga, are compared. A
close look at the facts of these cases shows that they are not alike and their
differences are reflected in the individualized outcomes.
A. Kimura Versus Wu
Both Fumika Kimura and Helen Wu claimed to engage in a similar
practice of parent-child suicide (where neither of them succeeded in killing
herself). Yet, Fumiko Kimura received a sentence of five years probation
after an involuntary manslaughter plea,' and Helen Wu ultimately, upon
retrial, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to the

166. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American
Infanticide, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 42-49 (1996) (stating that most women who kill their children
are charged with first-degree murder, and, while there is a pattern of lenience in sentencing, the
perceived "bad" mothers receive harsh outcomes).
167. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, ConceptualizingViolence Against PregnantWomen, 81 IND.
L.J. 667, 689-90 (2006) (chronicling the criminalization of pregnant women for "prenatal abuse,"
including drug use).
168. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 1142-43 (arguing that the facts of Smith were, "in all
relevant aspects other than culture, the same as those in Kimura" and that the child victims of
immigrant crimes should get the same protection of the laws); see Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215
(Tex. App. 2005) (describing facts of case and overturning conviction due to prosecutorial
misconduct).
169. No. A-091133 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Nov. 21, 1985).
170. 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. App. 1991).
171. 551 So. 2d 1094 (Ala. App. 1988).
172. 538 P.2d 849 (Wash. App. 1975).
173. See Goel, supra note 3, at 443-44.
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maximum prison term of eleven years.' 7 4 Leti Volpp objects that this
shows inconsistency in the treatment of culture in the courtroom.'75
However, the facts of Wu show Wu's actions to be far more motivationally
complex than what we know about Kimura's motivations.
Helen Wu was born in Saigon, China and eventually moved to Macau
as a teenager.'76 She met Gary Wu in 1963, who then left for the United
States and married another woman. Fifteen years later, after Helen had
been married, had a daughter, and was divorced, Gary Wu contacted her
and urged her to come to the United States.' 7 7 He told her that he was
going to divorce his wife, who was infertile, and marry Helen.'78 Helen
moved to the United States in 1979 and bore a son fathered by Gary,
named Sidney.' 79 When Gary did not marry her, she returned to Macau,
depressed, and without Sidney, since having a child out of wedlock would
have been considered shameful and she and Sidney would have been
humiliated in China. 0 For the next seven years, she tried to persuade Gary
to bring Sidney to Macau to visit.' He finally came after she promised to
give him money for his restaurant business in return.8 2 Gary proposed
marriage, but Helen refused because she thought it was only because of the
money. Helen was so discouraged that she attempted to throw herself out
a window, but was restrained by a friend.8 3
Finally, in 1989, Helen returned to the United States to visit Gary's sick
mother, who told her that she had better take care of Sidney after she died,
because Gary did not take good care of him." Gary then took Helen to
Las Vegas to get married. 8 5 On the drive back from the wedding, Helen
asked him if he only married her for her money. 6 Gary told her she had
no right to speak until she produced the money. 8 7 A few days later, Helen
174. Renteln, A Justification,supra note 5, at 474 n. 141 (citing news articles and interview
with Wu's attorney).
175. See Volpp, supra note 3, at 90-91.
176. The facts of the case are taken from the appellate opinion. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal.
App. 1991), rev'g No. ICR 12873 (Super. Ct. Riverside Co. 1990), review denied Jan. 23, 1992
(unpublished opinion).
177. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 871.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 871-72.
185. Id. at 872.
186. Id.
187. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
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witnessed Gary hit eight-year-old Sidney before leaving the house to host
a party for a friend named Rosemary.188 Sidney then told her that Gary beat
him regularly, that Gary called Helen "psychotic," and that the house they
were in belonged to Rosemary, who was Gary's girlfriend. 89 Sidney said
he thought Gary loved Rosemary more than him.19
Helen began to experience heart palpitations and trouble breathing.'91
She told Sidney she wanted to die and asked if he wanted to come with
her.'92 He clung to her and cried.' 93 She then left the bedroom to cut the
cord off a window blind, returned, and strangled him. 94 After thinking
how easily Sidney had died, she wrote Gary a note saying that he had
bullied her too much and "now this air is vented. I can die with no
' She did not mention killing Sidney in the note.'96 After failing
regret."195
to strangle herself with the cord, she cut her wrist with a knife and lay
down next to Sidney.'97 Several hours later, when Gary returned, Helen
was in a semi-conscious state.'98 She was rushed to the emergency room
and revived.' 99
At the jury trial, the prosecution's theory was that Helen killed Sidney
because of anger at Gary, and to get revenge. 20 ' The defense theory was
two-fold. First, that Helen was incapable of forming the necessary intent
for murder because she was essentially unconscious at the time of the
crimes.20 ' She testified she did not remember strangling Sidney 202 and a
psychiatric expert testified she was in a "fugue" state, or "a kind of
automatic mechanism that change[s] the mentality into a different state.
Like dreaming state or different state that usually don't retain the
memory. 2 3 Acceptance of this theory would have supported either a heat
of passion manslaughter conviction 2' or an acquittal.20 5 Second, the
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
Id.
Id.at 873.
Id. at 870.
Id.at 873.
Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
Id. at 874 (testimony of Dr. Ching-Piao Chien, M.D.).
See id.at 875 (quoting Dr. Chien's testimony that "she was under a kind of heat of
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defense claimed that Helen was not acting with malice, but out of an
intense emotional upheaval where she killed Sidney, and attempted to kill
herself, in order to take care of Sidney in the afterlife.2" 6 Acceptance of this
theory would have supported a reduction to heat of passion manslaughter.
To support the latter theory, the defendant called experts on transcultural
psychology to explain the cultural stresses Helen experienced, including
issues of Sidney's illegitimacy, and that no one would be able to care for
him after the grandmother's death. 207 Dr. Chien described the Chinese
belief in an afterlife and then offered that, because of her depression,
Helen "would feel that she couldn't really do the duty to the son, so the
only way to fulfill her duty when she realized her son was neglected and
not to be cared [for] by anybody in the future, she thought the way to go
is to the heaven. 20 8 He testified she acted out of love and responsibility.2 9
Dr. Terry Gock testified that the alternatives she saw were culturally
determined and her purpose was a "benevolent one",l°: "inher culture, in
her own mind, there are no other options but to kill herself and take the son
along with her so that they could sort of step over to the next world where
she could2 devote herself, all of herself to the caring of the son, caring of
Sidney." 11
The jury convicted Helen of second-degree murder, and the judge
sentenced her to fifteen years to life, the maximum prison term for seconddegree murder.212 While the jury had the opportunity to hear all of the
cultural evidence in the case, the trial court erroneously refused to instruct
the jury on the automatism defense or that it could take into account her
cultural background in deciding whether she was acting out of malice or
heat of passion. 213 The court of appeals reversed, and on retrial, the
instructions were read and the jury convicted her of voluntary
manslaughter.2" 4 Her final sentence was eleven years in prison.

emotion or I call it a heat of passion that went out like a dreamy state.").
205. Id. at 877 (explaining unconsciousness as a complete defense because "to support a
conviction for a criminal act there must be 'ajoint operation of act and intent."') (citation omitted).
206. Id. at 870.
207. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85.
208. Id.at 885 (quoting testimony of Chien).
209. Id.
210. Id.at 886 (quoting testimony of Gock).
211. Id.at887.
212. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
213. Id.
214. Id.Maguigan points out that this result upon retrial demonstrates the danger that in the
absence ofjury instructions factfinders will not recognize the relevance of their cultural evidence
to existing defenses. Maguigan, supra note 3, at 79.
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Both Kimura and Wu committed crimes equivalent to voluntary
manslaughter. However, Fumiko Kimura received the benefit of an
involuntary manslaughter plea and the judge's sympathy, and Helen Wu
did not. Why? Little is known about Kimura's motivations, and the
cultural explanation which was offered at her plea through 4000 letters
from members of the Japanese-Americans, was accepted." 5 One of the
benefits of a plea bargain is that no one ever hears the intimate details of
the crime. However, Wu's actions seemed to revolve around her obsession
with Gary, right down to her final note to him, which did not mention
Sidney. While the defense proffered a theory of undying devotion to her
child, the prosecution proffered a theory of revenge.2?1 6 The reality is likely
somewhere between the two.
Volpp claims that Wu demonstrates the point that "if a defendant's
behavior does not sufficiently match what experts describe as 'traditional'
cultural behavior, she may lose the opportunity to offer testimony as to her
cultural background."2 7 This did not happen in Wu's case. Although the
trial judge denied a requested instruction in the first trial, the cultural
evidence was in fact presented, and the jury was not told it could not take
such evidence into account. 218 Also, the argument that Wu did not get the
benefit of the cultural defense (as Kimura did) because she was a nontraditional mother denies the fact that the cultural practice depends upon
tradition. Wu had not lived with her son for seven years, and it would not
be irrational for ajuror to find she did not have the same intensity of bonds
as a mother who has raised and lives with her children.219 Perhaps the two
cases are not so different as to merit the difference between probation and

215. During the pendency of the case, 4000 letters signed by Japanese-Americans were
received stating that Kimura's act was common in Japan and that, while criminalized, would be
treated as no more than manslaughter. The Kimura court expressly considered the punishment she
would have received in Japan. See Coleman, supra note 4, at I110 nn. 85-88.
216. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
217. Volpp, supra note 3, at 63. See also Volpp, supranote 3, at 90:
The particular threshold test that the trial court applied to Wu relied on a
stereotype of Asian women as the self-sacrificing woman/mother. We can
speculate that the trial court felt persuaded that Helen Wu should not benefit from
such a defense because she gave birth to Sidney out of wedlock and was thus not
a "traditional Chinese woman."
218. See Volpp, supra note 3, at 86 n.133 (stating that, despite a specific instruction, the
California jury instructions left a lot of leeway for the jury to consider the cultural differences).
219. See Goel, supra note 3, at 447-48 (describing Kimura's close bond with her children,
"consistent with the Japanese views of motherhood as a transcendent state of being that surpasses
all other life roles.").
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eleven years in jail, but the two cases are also not so alike that Kimura and
Wu must have received the same treatment.
B. Kimura and Wu Versus Bui
In Bui v. State,220 Quang Ngoc Bui received a death sentence for killing
his three children despite an appearance of a parent-child suicide
attempt. 221 His sentence is obviously far more severe than Kimura's or
Wu's. Is this a blatant inconsistency due to cultural insensitivity, a gender
bias, or are the cases actually different? Again, a closer look at the
presentation of Bui's defense shows his cultural explanation of his actions
to be the weakest of all three defendants.
At the time of the murders, Bui's wife had been away from home for
two days and was in the company of a male friend. She refused to come
home, despite her husband's urgings.223 In a final phone call, he told her
she would have to get home in fifteen minutes if she ever wanted to see the
children alive again. 224 After fifteen minutes, he said he "lost his temper"
and cut the jugular veins of his three children.225 Blood stains on the knees
of his pants suggested that he restrained them by kneeling on them while
he cut them.226 Medical evidence suggested it took the children as long as
five minutes to lose consciousness, during which time they said to the
defendant "it hurts., 227 He then made non life-threatening cuts into his own
neck. 228 At the hospital, Bui told the police, "I cut my kids. I didn't want
her to get them., 229 At the police station, Bui admitted he killed the
children because he was mad at his wife, and did not want her to have
them.230
At trial, the defense called an expert in "cross cultural counseling" who
interviewed Bui to determine to what extent his actions were "dictated by
cultural misunderstanding., 231' He concluded that the defendant had been
depressed and was concerned about "loss of face" from the conduct of his

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

551 So. 2d 1094 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
Id. at 1098.
Id.at 1099.
Id.
Id.
Bui, 551 So.2d at 1099.
Id. at 1109.
Id.
Id.at 1098.
Id.at 1099.
Bui, 551 So. 2d at 1099.
Id. at 1101-02.
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wife, and the attempted suicide was a "face saving measure" which was
understandable in Asia, and not an irrational act. 32 This expert testimony
was at odds with the testimony of a defense psychiatrist who testified that
Bui suffered from an acute psychotic reaction at the time of the killings. 33
Ann Lam speculates the reason for a different outcome in Bui than Wu
and Kimura is "blatant sexual and racial bias on the part of the Alabama
courts," and that if cultural evidence had been seriously considered, it
could have mitigated his sentence.234 Daina Chiu argues that the contrast
between the sentence in Kimura and Bui demonstrates the point that
cultural evidence is only relevant when it enforces notions of "sameness"
with the dominant culture - here, that women who kill their children are
victims, while men who kill their children are evil.235 Despite these
protestations, and to whatever extent they may be right, the facts of Bui do
not tend to show a parent acting out of a cultural tradition, but a man trying
to manipulate his wife through her children. His words and actions made
this fairly explicit. While Helen Wu also may have been manipulating
Gary by harming Sidney, her lighter sentence reflects the ambiguity in the
evidence: it was simply less clear what motivated her.
C. Wanrow Versus Charliaga
The final comparison in the search for uneven treatment of cultural
cases is State v. Wanrow,236 and the unpublished case of Kathryn
Charliaga. Although Holly Maguigan finds these cases demonstrate a
harmful inconsistency,237 the facts of the two cases are simply not
comparable.
Yvonne Wanrow was convicted of second-degree murder in the killing
of a man who had allegedly molested her friend's daughter.238 Wanrow's
friend learned that the decedent had molested her children and was afraid
he might break into her house.239 She called Wanrow to come stay with
her, and Wanrow came over with a pistol.24° Unbeknownst to Wanrow,
during the night the decedent was invited into the house to discuss the

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 1102.
Id.at 1104.
Lam, supranote 5, at 60.
Chiu, supranote 1, at 1118-19.
559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (en banc).
See Maguigan, supra note 3, at 82-83.
538 P.2d 849, 850 (Wash. App. 1975).
Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 550-51.
Id. at 551.
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situation.241 Wanrow suddenly found herself confronted with the decedent
and fired the pistol, killing him.242
Wanrow claimed self-defense at trial.243 She proposed calling an expert
witness on Indian culture to testify that:
Indians are very family oriented; they maintain a strong feeling of
respect for their elders; and unnatural sex acts are not accepted by
Indian culture. Specifically, defendant's expert witness would have
testified that an Indian, confronted by an older person attempting to
perform an unnatural sex act on a young child, would undergo a
more traumatic emotional experience than would a member of the
Anglo-Saxon culture because of the highly respected position an
older person possesses in the Indian culture."2 44
The trial court did not entirely exclude the evidence, but rather,
excluded it as a form of a freestanding cultural defense.214 The judge ruled
that a psychiatric expert could testify to the effect that the Indian culture
might have had on Wanrow's state of mind.2 46 The court was clearly
searching for the missing relevancy link between the proffered evidence
and Wanrow's state of mind. At issue was the reasonableness of her fear
of serious bodily harm or death.2 47 Evidence that she would have
experienced a "traumatic emotional experience" would demonstrate a
"heat of passion," but not a reasonable fear of serious bodily harm.
Further, according to the expert, the emotional upheaval would have come
from confronting him while he was molesting a child, which did not
happen here. While critics of the case argue that the trial court deprived
Wanrow of crucial cultural evidence,2 48 such evidence was not only
irrelevant, but likely not necessary to persuade the jurors to be sympathetic
to a woman confronted with a child molester - even the "average AngloSaxon" would be so moved.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 555.
244. State v. Wanrow, 538 P.2d 849, 853 (Wash. App. 1975).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 853.
247. Id. (describing issue as link between preferred evidence and her "state of mind"). See
DRESSLER, supra note 91, at 237 (describing the elements of self-defense, that "deadly force is only
justified in self-protection if the actor reasonably believes that its use is necessary to prevent
imminent and unlawful use of deadly force by the aggressor.").
248. See Maguigan, supranote 3.
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In the comparison case, Kathryn Charliaga was charged with killing her
husband. Charliaga claimed that she acted in self-defense after years of
abuse.249 She called two expert witnesses: one on battered woman's
syndrome, to explain how the abuse led her to reasonably believe she was
in imminent danger; and one on women's subservient roles in Aleut
villages, to describe a culture that tolerated domestic abuse and had no
means of supporting a woman's attempt to leave the relationship.' Both
witnesses testified, and Charliaga was acquitted.25 ' Holly Maguigan argues
that the contrasting outcomes in Wanrow and Charliaga"illustrate the
necessity of admitting cultural evidence at trials in order to avoid silencing
'
or distorting women's voices."252
These two cases cannot be compared to illustrate Maguigan's point.
Wanrow was faced with an unarmed man who had not directly harmed her,
but had molested a child. The link between the cultural evidence and her
defense was far from clear. On the other hand, Charliaga was facing
further physical abuse from a man who had abused her in the past, and
both experts' testimony was relevant to establish her reasonable fear of
imminent serious bodily harm or death, the necessary ingredient to a selfdefense claim.
In all of these comparisons, we should ask the basic, preliminary
question: Is consistency in outcomes a goal of the criminal justice system?
If "consistency" means the same outcome or punishment for the same
class of crime, then our system ofjustice violates that principle every day
through individualized treatment of defendants. It is not enough to say that
an injustice is done when a murderer goes free in one case, while someone
who commits a lesser offense gets a harder sentence.5 3 Individualized
justice demands a study of individual facts and circumstances and leads to
different outcomes. Individualized treatment means that, while Kimura and
Bui both killed their children over anguish from a spouse's infidelity, they
do not necessarily deserve the same sentence.
Additionally, consistency is not a realistic goal if we also prize the right
to a trial by jury. For better or for worse, we value our system ofjudgment
by a jury of one's peers and not professional factfinders. Every day in
courtrooms across America, jurors hand out inconsistent verdicts, despite

249. See id. at 82.
250. Maguigan, supra note 3, at 82 (describing the case from news sources).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 82-83.
253. See Renteln, A Justification, supra note 5, at 439 (arguing this). At the same time,
Renteln promotes considering culture in order to get "individualized justice." Id.at 444.
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similar facts and law. We value their judgment, messy humanity, and
mercy.
While consistency is assured to the point that we define classes of
crimes so that like crimes are grouped together, juries still use their own
judgment to classify the crime before them, and judges are given discretion
to decide the punishment within a given range. There is no doubt that this
discretion leads to injustices - minorities and cultural defendants may
receive harsher sentences due to the judge's own biases. However, the fix
for this is not to take the discretion out of sentencing. Rigidity promotes
its own injustices. Indeed, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines stated that
federal judges could not take into account "national origin" at all. This rule
was an attempt to tame bias, but led to the exclusion of cultural evidence
in sentencing.254 As with most intractable issues of race, class, and gender,
this is a problem that legislation cannot fix. Unsympathetic judges must be
educated and held publicly responsible, and sympathetic judges must be
placed on the bench.
V. THE SUGGESTED CULTURAL "FIXES"

Cultural evidence scholars offer two basic "fixes" for the three
problems discussed in this Essay: 1) either establish a freestanding cultural
defense; or 2) allow the evidence if it is relevant to mens rea, but not if it
oppresses or stereotypes women or cultural minorities. Both strategies are
unnecessary, and both would lead to more problems than solutions.
Only a few scholars have advocated a freestanding cultural defense.255
The admissibility of cultural evidence under this defense would not depend
upon whether the evidence is relevant to an element of the crime or to an
established defense. The formulations of the defense by at least three
authors demonstrate the intractability of a definition; their suggestions
involve subjective evaluations that would lead to no more consistency than
at present.z56
254. See supra text accompanying note 159 (discussing Guidelines' limitation).
255. See infra note 256 (citing three authors).
256. See Note, supra note 5, at 1308-09 (suggesting the court evaluate "factors such as the
probability of recurrence and severity of the crime"; "identifiability, degree of self-containment,
and size of the defendant's cultural group;" "inquiry into the influence of the defendant's culture
on her behavior"); id. at 1310-11 ("The precise way in which courts will balance these factors will,
of course, vary from case to case."); Lam, supra note 5, at 51 (giving four criteria for when a
cultural defense should apply: (1) prior life in home country must distinguish defendant from
mainstream society; (2) defendant's current attitudes about being a minority in U.S. culture must
create problems in mainstream culture; (3) degree of assimilation must be so low unfair to punish;
(4) criminal act must reflect values of sufficient importance to the accused's culture); Renteln, A
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Other authors have perceived the basic problems with the establishment
of a cultural defense.257 Who can claim it? What degree of nonassimilation must be shown? Must everyone agree on the cultural tradition,
or just some members of the culture?258 As Holly Maguigan says,
"[Jiudges are no better trained than the legal and anthropological experts
and scholars who have failed to come to agreement to define culture, to
choose among competing and inconsistent voices purporting to speak for
a culture, to decide which characteristics of a culture merit recognition of
a separate defense. 259
One premise for the need for such a defense is that judges are either
finding the evidence irrelevant due to insensitivity to cultural issues, or
they are treating the cases inconsistently. Hopefully, the review of cases
in this Essay has shown that this premise may be inaccurate. In addition,
those who advocate for a separate defense say one is needed for the cases
that simply do not fit the traditional defenses. 26" Daina Chiu posits Kimura,
Kong Moua and Wu are all cases that are uniquely cultural, and cannot be
accommodated by traditional criminal law defenses. 261 However, the
cultural situations of Kimura and Wu are both accommodated by the
partial excuse of voluntary manslaughter. Kong Moua was accommodated
with a mistake of fact defense, which allowed for evidence of his lack of
mens rea.
The more prevalent suggestion for a cultural fix has two parts. The first
is a suggestion for "limited use" of the cultural evidence, only as relevant
to mens rea. That suggestion is unnecessary because that is what the courts
are already doing: that is simply business as usual. This Essay has shown

Justification, supra note 5, at 440 (leaving it to juries to "decide whether cultural factors were

determinative in a defendant's behavior, and, if so, whether that is sufficient to warrant either a
lesser charge or complete acquittal.").
257. Maguigan, supranote 3, at 44 ("[T] here is not and will not be a separate cultural defense
because as a practical matter such a defense can be neither defined nor implemented."); Chiu, supra
note 1, at 1103 ("it is extremely unlikely as a practical matter that any jurisdiction will create or
adopt the defense as an excuse for criminal acts.").
258. See Maguigan, supra note 3, at 56 ("Most advocates have failed to contend with the
definitional questions essential to establishing a workable defense, while most opponents have not
responded to the reality that courts are examining cultural information in a variety of contexts
without establishing a freestanding defense."); Chin, supra note 1, at 1101-02 (describing
problematic issues of defining the culture defense and who could raise it); Coleman, supranote 4,
at 1162-63 (also noting the practical problems in identifying culture: culture is not permanent;
multiculturalists are not willing to extend it to non-immigrant Americans; some segments of a
culture accept a practice and some reject).
259. Maguigan, supra note 3, at 54.
260. See Renteln, A Justification,supra note 5, at 446, 487.
261. Chiu, supranote 1, at 1106-07.
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that when the evidence was relevant to mens rea, it was generally allowed,
and when the relevancy link was not made, it was generally rejected.
Courts have considered the cultural evidence relevant in crimes and
defenses involving issues of the defendant's "reasonableness" in acting as
he or she did. Nonetheless, some scholars' suggestion that this should be
made clear, by instructing the jurors that the "reasonable person in the
defendant's situation" includes a "situation" of coming from a different
culture with different cultural beliefs,262 is an excellent one. While judges
have generally found this to be the case, this will ensure the admission of
the cultural evidence to assess "reasonableness."
The second part of the "limited use" suggestion is a caveat that some
scholars add: the evidence cannot be used if it oppresses women or
children or stereotypes a culture.263 Some call for the judge to engage in a
nuanced balancing test to determine whether the evidence is oppressive or
stereotyped. 264 Leti Volpp suggests the admissibility of cultural evidence
should be decided through a lens of "antisubordination. 265 The judge
would have to "examine whether the defendant acted with a consciousness
of her position within the social structure of her community. 2 66 Hence,
cultural evidence would be admissible in Wu because "Helen Wu resisted
what she perceived as subordination out of a set of narrowly defined

262. See Renteln, A Justification,supranote 5,at 476-77 (arguing that the reasonable person
is standard problematic if cultural evidence is not considered); Lam, supranote 5, at 54 (suggesting
"reasonable cultural minority" standard in using the provocation defense).
263. See Sacks, supra note 3, at 548 (suggesting courts should admit cultural information with
care and avoid characterizing defendants as "compelled" to act in a certain way because of their
cultural beliefs, defense attorneys should not promote racist stereotypes); Levine, supranote 3, at
41, 74 (arguing cultural evidence should not be allowed in cases where defendant intended harm,
such as Chen, because it will promote disdain for minority groups); Kim, supra note 3, at 116
(arguing problem with the limited use approach in practice has been courts enforcing harmful
stereotypes and encouraging oppressive practices against subordinated groups and suggesting new
test).
264. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 3, at 133 (arguing a judge should weigh four factors in
determining whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its potential to mislead
jury members or confuse the issues: (1) whether the purpose of the cultural practice is to perpetuate
the subordination of a particular group, such as women; (2) the moral culpability associated with
the cultural practice; (3) the deterrence/education value of prohibiting the practice; and (4) the
availability of alternative forms of sentencing); Coleman, supra note 4 (calling for balancing of
victims' rights versus defendant's rights and deciding victims' rights trump presentation of cultural
evidence that discriminates against the victims).
265. Volpp, supranote 3, at 99 ("Antisubordination, as premised on the vastness ofoppression
along international lines, such as male oppression of women, and xenophobic oppression of
immigrants, must be the value of whether to support the use of cultural evidence in a defense and
what information should be presented.").
266. Id.at 98.
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choices 2' ' 6 7 and inadmissible in Chen because "Dong Lu Chen acted to
' Further, the evidence should only
constrain his wife's choices further."268
be "articulated by community members who are sensitive to the dynamics
of power and subordination within the community of the defendant. So, in
cases involving women who are abused, such as Jian Wan Chen or Helen
Wu, input from organizations that work with battered Asian women is
imperative."269
Volpp's more detailed suggestion demonstrates the problems of valuing
antisubordination over relevancy in criminal cases. Judges would now
have to decide who is oppressed and who is the oppressor, a deeply
complicated, sociological, and cultural issue. Consider, for example, the
view that Helen Wu acted because she was resisting oppression. That
would depend upon a flexible definition of oppression as well as causation.
Why did she kill Sidney? Couldn't one say she was the oppressor? And,
if she was constrained by social norms to act in the manner she did, is that
not also true for Dong Lu Chen? Was he at all oppressed by his wife's
refusal of him, her taunts, and her alleged beatings of him?27 ° To the extent
these are sociological issues, they are best left outside the hands ofjudges,
and to the extent these are issues of fact, they belong to the jury.
Ridding society of gender and cultural oppression is a goal of the
utmost importance. However, asking the criminal justice system to take the
lead is highly problematic. Until and unless there is a consensus on the
meaning of "oppression," "culture," or other sociological terms, the
cultural evidence should be presented to the jury whenever it is relevant.

VI. CONCLUSION

Cultural evidence cases are a magnet for scrutiny. Scholars who have
studied a small group of those cases have been uniformly displeased with
the treatment of culture in the courtroom. This Essay has endeavored to
unpack those concerns and determine where the trouble lies. Far from
concluding there are no problems in the presentation of the evidence, this
Essay has determined problems do exist, but they do not appear to stem

267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.at 100.
270. Dong Lu Chen testified that his wife became abusive toward him during their period of
separation, including beating him. Volpp, supranote 3, at 64 n.30 (quoting Record, supranote 14,
at 183-84, 213, 217, 219). According to him, she became "increasingly more brutal ... she was
hitting him, telling him to drop dead[.]" Id.at 65 n.32 (quoting Record, supranote 14, at 66).

DECONSTRUCTING THE CULTURAL EVIDENCE DEBATE

from the cultural insensitivity assumed by the scholars. Rather, they are
failures of advocacy and of the substantive criminal law.
By and large, judges have followed the law in deciding admissibility
of cultural evidence.27' In some cases, their rulings were handicapped by
prosecutors and defense attorneys who failed to properly present or
counter the cultural evidence. Additionally, the limits of the substantive
criminal law have prevented better treatment of women as victims of
cultural violence. These problems are not culture-specific and do not
require a culture-specific solution. They are overriding evidentiary and
criminal justice issues which arise in cases with defendants no matter
where they were born and raised.
There is little doubt that American society stereotypes, demeans, and
discriminates against other cultures. The goal of society should be to
eradicate this discrimination. However, that is not the main goal of the
criminal justice system. Evidence of cultural practices may contain
stereotypes or be oppressive, but, unless it is irrelevant or unreliable, the
criminal justice system must see to it that defendants are allowed to
present it in their defense. Relevancy is a concept that the criminal justice
system understands and it should remain the touchstone for cultural
evidence.

271. Hopefully, the use ofmultiple cases to demonstrate this Essay's conclusions has answered
some of the potential retorts. See, e.g., Maguigan, supra note 3, at 86-87:
Commentators who argue that no corrective measures are necessary because the
current criminal justice system sufficiently accommodates cultural information
ignore the fact that courts often fail to find cultural information either admissible
or relevant to jury instructions requested by defendants. Those commentators...
urge reliance on judicial discretion without considering the limits imposed by
pluralistic ignorance. They assume the admissibility of cultural evidence at trial
without analyzing the examples of its exclusion or ofjudicial determinations that
the evidence, even when it is received, fails to satisfy existing definitional
requirements.
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